How Democracies Die (part 3)

June 29, 2018

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In the last chapter of their book, Levitsky and Ziblatt discuss the prospects for sustaining democracy in the face of the threats from Donald Trump and other such demagogues. They think it can be done, but it will take a lot of work.

The global challenge

The impression one gets from recent news is that democracy is in retreat all over the world. The authors do not think that the evidence supports that pessimistic conclusion.

The number of democracies rose dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, peaked around the year 2005, and has remained steady ever since. Backsliders make headlines and capture our attention, but for every Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela there is a Colombia, Sri Lanka, or Tunisia—countries that have grown more democratic over the last decade.

The bad news is that the election of Donald Trump appears to be a setback for democracy not only in the United States but around the world. The Western powers under the leadership of the United States have played a role in encouraging democratic principles and institutions since World War II (although I would add that our pro-democracy principles have often been compromised by self-serving economic policies). Trump’s “America first” nationalism is weakening the Western alliance and strengthening the position of undemocratic countries like Russia and China. I find it especially ironic that Republicans who in the past demanded unwavering opposition to our Cold War adversaries now look the other way while Trump offends our democratic allies and cozies up to dictators.

The future at home

The authors describe three possible futures for the United States after the Trump phenomenon runs its course. The most optimistic is that our democratic norms and institutions quickly recover from whatever damage his presidency does to them. That might be realistic if Trump alone were the problem. But as the authors have discussed, the deeper problem is the polarization of our politics arising from deep disagreements over race and religion, compounded by an economic system that is leaving too many people behind.

That raises a second and more troubling possibility, that the Republican party, having become the party of Trump, maintains its power with a white nationalist appeal. That would entail running the country primarily for the benefit of a shrinking population of white Christians, and resorting to undemocratic means of suppressing the more diverse majority. “Such a nightmare scenario isn’t likely, but it also isn’t inconceivable.”

The most likely future is “one marked by polarization, more departures from unwritten political conventions, and increasing institutional warfare–in other words, democracy without solid guardrails.” The authors point to the state of North Carolina as the best example of “what politics without guardrails might look like.” For those who don’t live here, I’ll just say that Republican legislators gerrymandered the state so that they could win 10 of 13 Congressional seats with only 53% of the vote, passed voting laws that targeted black voters with “almost surgical precision” according to a federal court, and reduced the powers of the governor right after a democrat was elected to that position. The state is hardly a dictatorship yet, however, since Republican efforts at one-party domination have been vigorously resisted by the opposition party and the courts.

Reducing polarization

Political leaders will either have to learn to cooperate and compromise despite the polarization, which the authors think is doubtful, or they will have to move beyond the polarization. Although the authors call on both parties to reconsider what they stand for, they put the main responsibility for change on the Republican party, since they consider it “the main driver of the chasm between the parties.” They see more of the obstructionism, partisan hostility, and extremism on that side of the aisle.

For Republicans, they recommend changes in both organization and constituency. The leadership will have to regain some control, relying less heavily on outside donors and right-wing media. And the party must become more diverse:

Republicans must marginalize extremist elements; they must build a more diverse electoral constituency, such that the party no longer depends so heavily on its shrinking white Christian base; and they must find ways to win elections without appealing to white nationalism, or what Republican Arizona senator Jeff Flake calls the “sugar high of populism, nativism, and demagoguery.”

As for the Democrats, they should resist calls to focus on white working-class voters at the expense of their black and immigrant constituencies. But what they can do is address economic concerns that cut across race and religion. As I have argued before, they can emphasize universal benefits programs such as universal health insurance, basic income guarantee, job training, paid parental leave, subsidized child care and prekindergarten education.

Now I think I’ve been reading and writing enough for a while about the culture wars and the partisan divide. What I’m thinking about lately is the fiscal problem of how the country might pay for the more progressive public policies many Democrats advocate. Stay tuned.


How Democracies Die (part 2)

June 28, 2018

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Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have described Donald Trump as a demagogue with authoritarian tendencies. He has not yet done serious damage to our democratic system, but the threat is definitely there.

That’s only part of their story, however. Democracy was already under stress well before Trump’s election. “Not only did Americans elect a demagogue in 2016, but we did so at a time when the norms that once protected our democracy were already coming unmoored.”

Democratic norms

It takes more than a well-designed constitution to sustain a viable democracy. After the decline of colonialism in Latin America, many of the newly independent states based their constitutions on ours, but that didn’t stop them from falling into civil war and dictatorship. “All successful democracies rely on informal rules that, though not found in the constitution or any laws, are widely known and respected.”

Two very general political norms are fundamental. “Mutual toleration” acknowledges the right of rival factions to compete for political power and achieve it, as long as they do so through constitutional means. “Institutional forbearance” is a commitment to abide by the democratic spirit of the laws, not just the letter of the laws. When those two norms break down, one or more parties may use the laws in ways that were never intended, to destroy their opposition instead of competing with them fairly.

Political polarization

What is most likely to weaken or destroy the norms is political polarization based on socioeconomic, racial or religious differences.

In the history of U.S. democracy, the most polarizing issue has been race, but racial polarization has not been a constant. Race has been most polarizing at times when one major party has taken up the cause of racial justice, as opposed to times when both parties have been tolerant of racial injustice.

In the nineteenth century, it was the Republican rejection of slavery that brought the issue to the forefront, “investing politics with what one historian has called a new ’emotional intensity.'” (I find the reference to emotionalism interesting, considering that in our current era of polarization, social scientists have been “discovering” that politics is more emotional than rational.) After the Civil War and Reconstruction, some political peace was restored, but at the expense of the rights of the newly freed slaves. In one of the greatest assaults on democracy in our history, southern whites got away with restoring white supremacy.

Between 1885 and 1908, all eleven post-Confederate states reformed their constitutions and electoral laws to disenfranchise African Americans. To comply with the letter of the law as stipulated in the Fifteenth Amendment, no mention of race could be made in efforts to restrict voting rights, so states introduced purportedly “neutral” poll taxes, property requirements, literacy tests, and complex written ballots….Black turnout in the South fell from 61 percent in 1880 to just 2 percent in 1912. The disenfranchisement of African Americans wiped out the Republican Party, locking in white supremacy and single-party rule for nearly a century.

By keeping race off the agenda at the national level, the two major parties were able to find more common ground. For most of the twentieth century, they were both “big tents” that included many of the same kinds of people. Married white Christians constituted a majority of both parties. The Democrats had the southern white conservatives, but the Republicans had midwestern and western white conservatives. The Democrats had working-class New Deal liberals, but the Republicans had educated middle-class liberals.

Democratic support for civil rights legislation in the 1960s did more than anything to re-polarize the parties, as people of color embraced the Democratic Party but southern whites abandoned it. Declining support for traditional religion among Democrats contributed as well. “The two parties are now divided over race and religion–two deeply polarizing issues that tend to generate greater intolerance and hostility than traditional policy issues such as taxes and government spending.”

As for being “big tents,” the parties have moved in opposite directions. The Democratic Party has become more diverse, being a party of white and black, native-born and immigrant, religious and secular, gay and straight. The Republican Party has become less diverse, the home of the embattled white Protestant minority, the people who used to run the country but have been losing power recently. Levitsky and Ziblatt believe that the Republican party has led the way in weakening democratic norms in order to maintain their social and cultural dominance. Ironically, it is now the Republican party that is noted for trying to lock in single-party rule by suppressing the black vote.

While the authors focus mostly on race and secondarily on religion in this story, gender is also important. The Democratic Party has also become the party of women’s rights, while the Republican Party has become the party of angry men. That also is a reversal, since it was northern Republicans who originally supported the Equal Rights Amendment.

Erosion of democratic norms

Even in the twentieth-century period of relative political cooperation, democratic norms were challenged or violated by some leaders. Franklin Roosevelt exercised unusual power during the crises of Depression and war, running for president four times (legal but unprecedented), issuing over 300 executive orders a year, and trying unsuccessfully to expand the Supreme Court so he could appoint more justices. In the 1950s, attacks on Democrats by militant anti-communists like Joe McCarthy helped Republicans win the presidency and control of Congress. One of those red-baiting anti-communists, Richard Nixon, went on to use the presidency to attack the people on his “enemies list” in illegal ways.

The authors see a more ominous “unraveling” of democratic norms beginning in the 1990s. Newt Gingrich set the tone as he rose to the position of Speaker of the House, presenting a hostile, hard-line, no-compromise front against the moderate Democrat Bill Clinton. One sign of deviation from traditional practice was a dramatic increase in the use of the Senate filibuster to block majority-supported legislation. Democrats also made heavy use of it during the George W. Bush administration, while Republicans stopped following the practice of “regular order,” which had given the opposition a chance to speak on legislation and propose amendments. During the Obama years, so many of the President’s appointments were filibustered that Senate Democrats changed the rules to disallow the filibuster for appointments other than to the Supreme Court.

Until relatively recently, Supreme Court appointments by the President have rarely been rejected by the Senate. When President Reagan appointed arch-conservative Antonin Scalia, Democrats could have blocked it with a filibuster but instead supported it unanimously. But when President Obama appointed the moderate and highly qualified Merrick Garland, Republicans took the unprecedented step of refusing to consider the nomination at all. Then they changed the rules after the 2016 election to keep the Democrats from filibustering President Trump’s appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the open seat, insuring that conservatives would keep their 5-4 majority.

So now we have a potential autocrat in the White House, leading a party of embattled conservatives desperate to maintain their hold on power. The “devil’s bargain” between this man and this party could be bad news for democracy.

Continued


How Democracies Die

June 27, 2018

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Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing, 2018

This is a fitting moment to reflect on the strength of our democracy. Levitsky and Ziblatt are not just pursuing an academic investigation of democracies around the world; they are sounding the alarm about ours. They state frankly that they consider the election of Donald Trump a threat to democratic norms and institutions. “In 2016, for the first time in U.S. history, a man with no experience in public office, little observable commitment to constitutional rights, and clear authoritarian tendencies was elected president.”

The authors point out that in recent decades, most breakdowns of democracy have occurred not through military coups, but through the democratic election of leaders who used the powers of their office to promote authoritarian rule. “Like Chávez in Venezuela, elected leaders have subverted democratic institutions in Georgia, Hungary, Nicaragua, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Ukraine. Democratic backsliding today begins at the ballot box.”

All societies produce an extremist demagogue from time to time. In the most democratic countries, they usually don’t get elected. The threat to democracy arises when “fear, opportunism, or miscalculation leads established parties to bring extremists into the mainstream….” First those established parties fail to stop them from being elected; then they fail to stop them from violating democratic norms.

Webster’s Dictionary defines a demagogue as “a leader who makes use of popular prejudices and false claims and promises in order to gain power.” By that definition, I agree with the authors that Trump is the worst demagogue to make it to the White House in my lifetime, and probably in American history.  (To be fair, he appeals to some real economic concerns as well as to prejudice and misinformation, but he seems to have no coherent policy for actually addressing those concerns.)

Warning signs

The authors suggest four warning signs to help identify leaders with undemocratic, authoritarian tendencies:

  1. The leader “rejects, in words or action, the democratic rules of the game,” for example by flouting the Constitution or undermining free and fair elections.
  2. The leader “denies the legitimacy of opponents,” for example by describing them as criminals or subversives.
  3. The leader “tolerates or encourages violence,” for example by encouraging mob attacks or failing to condemn violence by supporters.
  4. The leader “indicates a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents, including the media,” for example by using civil or criminal law to suppress dissent and criticism.

Signs of Donald Trump’s undemocratic tendencies include rejecting President Obama’s legitimacy as president, claiming that millions of illegal immigrant voters cost him the popular vote, advocating that his opponent be locked up, promising to pay the legal bills of supporters who assault protestors, failing to condemn violent hate groups, and declaring the mainstream media “enemies of the people.” Yet to be determined is whether he welcomed–and maybe actively encouraged–Russian interference in the 2016 election on his behalf, and to what extent he has obstructed justice by trying to impede the investigation.

Undemocratic leaders generally arise from the ranks of populist outsiders. Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Federalist Papers, that “of those men who have overturned the liberties of republics, the great number have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.”

Republican party as failing gatekeeper

Every democracy needs gatekeepers to keep authoritarian demagogues from being elected; or if elected, from using their office to subvert democracy. In modern American history, the gatekeepers have normally been the mainstream political parties.

Striking a balance between gatekeeping and respecting the popular will has always been tricky. Too much gatekeeping, and party bosses are selecting leaders in the proverbial “smoke-filled room.” Too little gatekeeping, and populist sentiment can sweep loud-mouthed bullies into power. Primary elections, which were first introduced as a Progressive-Era reform, only became decisive in the 1970s. Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate in 1968, was the last candidate to get a presidential nomination without competing in the primaries. In the Democratic party, the influence of primaries is reduced slightly by having elected officials–so-called “superdelegates”–make up 15-20% of the convention delegations. In the Republican party, primaries rule, so the party base chooses the candidate. It’s not surprising that thirteen out of eighteen outsiders to compete in the last six presidential elections have been Republicans.

Establishment Republican leaders have also been weakened by powerful conservative interest groups funded by extremely wealthy donors like Sheldon Adelson and the Koch brothers, as well as by right-wing media outlets like Fox News. In order to protect democracy, party leaders have to be prepared to distance themselves from potential autocrats by keeping them off ballots, working to defeat them if they run, and avoiding forming alliances with them. Although some Republicans have stood up against Trump, the authors see more abdication than resistance within the party.

One reason why leaders cooperate with a budding dictator is that they mistakenly believe they can co-opt him, discovering only too late that he has become too powerful to control. Another is that their own agenda overlaps enough with his that they forfeit the long-term health of their democracy for some short-term gain. Most Republicans seem willing to tolerate Trump’s authoritarian tendencies and his narrow white Christian nationalism in return for the tax cuts and weak government regulation sought by their wealthy donors.

Subverting democracy

Unlike a military coup, the subversion of democracy by an elected demagogue proceeds slowly, in “baby steps.” For example, it is accomplished by “quietly firing civil servants and other nonpartisan officials and replacing them with loyalists.”  It is accomplished by gradually changing the political rules to stack the deck against an opposing party, or making life so difficult for the most outspoken opponents that other potential critics are intimidated.

The firing of FBI Director James Comey and the campaign to discredit the FBI is especially worrisome. We are about to see whether Trump will allow the investigation to proceed in accordance with the law or take more drastic action to obstruct it.

As of this time, the authors conclude that the President has “repeatedly scraped up against the guardrails, like a reckless driver, but he did not break through them.”  His transgressions have consisted mostly of “insult, lying, cheating, and bullying,” which are undermining civility but not replacing the rule of law. The greatest danger is that he might exploit some crisis to consolidate his power. Suppose the country were to experience a serious terrorist attack by a Muslim immigrant? I can easily imagine the President’s support going from 40% to 70%, emboldening him to declare martial law, round up and inter Muslims, crack down on dissent, and put an end to the Mueller investigation. Here’s food for thought:

A survey conducted in June 2017 asked, “If Donald Trump were to say that the 2020 presidential election should be postponed until the country can make sure that only eligible American citizens can vote, would you support or oppose postponing the election?” Fifty-two percent of Republicans said they would support postponement.

If asked to choose between following the leader and following the Constitution, half of one of our major political parties would choose the leader.

Continued


Strangers in Their Own Land (part 3)

June 22, 2018

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The rise of Donald Trump

Near the end of her book, Arlie Hochschild comments on the Trump phenomenon, observing that “the scene had been set for Trump’s rise, like kindling before a match is lit.” He appealed to the deep feelings of Tea Party conservatives in Louisiana–feelings of economic anxiety, cultural marginalization, and demographic decline. They felt that America was no longer the country of hard-working white Christians, secure in their economic achievements and traditional morality, but that Trump could somehow restore that America.

Trump is an “emotions candidate” who generates strong emotional responses but offers little in the way of specific policy proposals. He appeals only partly to economic self-interest, and largely to “emotional self-interest–a giddy release from the feeling of being a stranger in one’s own land.”

Right-wing regimes elsewhere are tapping into similar feelings, coming to power in Russia, Hungary and Poland, and gaining support in France, Germany and United Kingdom.

The liberal challenge

All this poses a huge challenge for liberal democracy in general and political liberals in particular.

Liberals have their own deep story, one that places high value on the “creatively designed, hard-won public sphere.” We created it to provide benefits that the private sphere does not provide, such as protection of our common environment. From a liberal standpoint, “marauders” are out to destroy the public sphere and convert its resources into sources of private profit.

Liberals can be passionate about their commitments too, which raises the question of whether today’s political battles are anything more than a clash of emotions. Hochschild doesn’t address the question of whether liberals have become as susceptible to propaganda and oblivious to facts and rational arguments as Trump enthusiasts and Fox News viewers have. I personally don’t think so. Historically, the left has succumbed to radical utopianism and violence at times, but I see little of that in the U.S. today.

Hochschild recommends several things for liberals to do:

  • Stand up for our democratic institutions, such as the independent judiciary and the free press
  • Address the legitimate concerns of people who feel that social change is leaving them behind
  • Cross the empathy divide, get to know people different from ourselves and stop disparaging them so much

With regard to the second point, Democrats need to be clear on what they have to offer the entire working class, without regard to race. They need to ask white men to stop worrying so much about the blacks or women trying to get ahead, and worry more about the proliferating robots, whom Hochschild calls the real line-cutters. They need to focus on what government can do to strengthen our economy by preparing our workers for the jobs that will remain once the routine work has been automated.

At one point, Hochschild says that if she could write a letter to her conservative friends, one thing she would tell them is to take a look at Norway. That country uses its wealth to improve the health, education and well-being of its citizens across the board. That’s different from focusing benefits on the poor alone, which tends to stigmatize recipients and incur the wrath of taxpayers. Both Anu Partanen’s The Nordic Theory of Everything and George Lakey’s Viking Economics stress the advantages of the Nordic approach. Of course, advocates of universal benefits must be prepared to argue with economic conservatives who claim that tax cuts are good for the economy but spending increases are bad.

I remain hopeful that the culture wars may subside as younger generations grow up more accustomed to new realities such as globalization, ethnic diversity, women’s equality and gay rights. Then maybe we can get on with the business of formulating economic policies that work for more people. And voters can get back to supporting candidates whose realistic proposals can actually help them instead of just channeling their anger.

In the end, Hochschild concludes, “I feel great admiration for the people I’ve met on the other side of the empathy wall. And while my vote will surely differ from theirs, I wish them well.” In a similar vein I would say that I respect the feelings of extreme conservatives, but I cannot be too swayed by them. Angry, mournful nostalgia is not a sound basis for public policy, any more than enthusiastic utopianism would be.


Strangers in Their Own Land (part 2)

June 19, 2018

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The deep story

Arlie Hochschild defines a deep story as a “feels-as-if-story…the story feelings tell, in the language of symbols. It removes judgment. It removes fact. It tell us how things feel.” She tries to grasp the deep story Tea Party conservatives tell themselves and others that explains many of the political positions they take, some of which seem to work against their own economic self-interest.

Hochschild conveys the deep story using the metaphor of a long line leading up a hill. “Just over the brow of the hill is the American Dream, the goal of everyone waiting in line.” If you work hard and live your life responsibly, you should expect to move forward.

You’ve suffered long hours, layoffs, and exposure to dangerous chemicals at work, and received reduced pensions. You have shown moral character through trial by fire, and the American Dream of prosperity and security is a reward for all of this, showing who you have been and are—a badge of honor.

But something has gone wrong in recent decades. While the very front of the line continues to progress, the line has bogged down for the great majority. That’s because gains in income have gone primarily to the richest tenth of the population. (Actually, she could have said the richest 1% or less.) There is still some individual movement forward or backward, of course. But without general advancement for the line as a whole, someone’s movement forward must be offset by someone else’s movement backward. That intensifies competition and puts the aspirations of different groups in conflict.

The people in the back of the line certainly aspire to move up, and liberals say that they deserve to, since most of them were born with fewer advantages than those farther ahead, and many have been unfairly held back for one reason or another. (In a fair race, of course, everyone is supposed to begin at the same starting line and run unimpeded.) On the other hand, people in the middle of the line can make a case for at least keeping the position they have, a position that reflects their hard-earned achievements. They may see the line more as a checkout line, where no one should cut in front of you.

In this context, people can have a strong emotional reaction to government assistance to those in the back of the line. Whether your reaction is sympathetic or resentful depends on whether you are willing to acknowledge the folks back there as underprivileged and disadvantaged, or if you prefer to defend your own position by seeing them as less deserving than you are. In the latter case, you see government assistance not so much remedying an injustice as creating one. As Hochschild’s Tea Partyers saw it, “The free market was the unwavering ally of the good citizens waiting in line for the American Dream. The federal government was on the side of those unjustly ‘cutting in.'”

Race and Southern conservatism

In theory, such attitudes toward economic inequality and the role of government can exist even if all the people in line are the same race. Add America’s sad racial history to the mix, and the emotional stakes get even higher. Hochschild considers race an essential part of the deep story, although her subjects were reluctant to discuss it.

The American South has always been known for its extremes of wealth and poverty, including considerable white poverty.

Compared to life in New England farming villages, there was much more wealth to envy above, and far more misery to gasp at below. Such a system suggested its own metaphoric line waiting for the American Dream—one with little room for the lucky ahead, and much room for the forgotten behind.

Lower-income Southern whites have always been stuck in the middle, having only limited opportunities to move up, but determined to defend their place against the aspirations of the large populations of black people behind them.

Here I would like to add that the voting history of Southern whites shows that they have not always been so hostile to Big Government. Louisiana supported every Democratic presidential candidate from Roosevelt to Kennedy (1932-1960), except when they supported the States Rights Democrat Strom Thurmond in 1948. Only after the national Democratic Party supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 did Southern whites turn Republican in large numbers. Now they vote very Republican in national races–Trump won by a 20% margin in Louisiana–although Democrat John Bel Edwards did win the governor’s race in a runoff election in 2016. As part of the Roosevelt coalition, Southern whites had little objection to New Deal programs like the WPA and GI Bill that benefited mostly whites, but they are more critical of anti-poverty programs like Medicaid and Food Stamps that go disproportionately to people of color. In fact-checking her subjects’ opinions, Hochschild found that they tended to exaggerate how much of the federal budget went to safety-net programs, how many people of working age were living on “welfare” instead of working, and what proportion of the poor were getting TANF (today’s main family assistance program), a proportion which was quite low in Louisiana.

Hochschild does not specifically accuse her subjects of racism, settling for the more general statement that “many Americans, north and south, are racist.” What we can say is that Tea Party conservatives oppose government programs designed to help the most disadvantaged Americans; that people of color rely more on such programs because of the legacy of discrimination; and that Southern whites are especially drawn to Tea Party conservatism. Put all that together and it strongly suggests that racial divisions reinforce the status anxieties and resentments of white people in the winner-take-all economy.

To the extent that Southern conservatism is racist, it is rarely the explicit segregationism of Strom Thurmond or the Ku Klux Klan. Hochschild’s subjects didn’t want to talk about black people very much at all, at least in her presence. But they did want to talk about the freeloaders and line-cutters, the people who want to get ahead of them without deserving to. It is hard for such complaints to avoid implicit reference to the people of color who are still at the back of the line, people who have long been demeaned by stereotypes of laziness and irresponsibility.

Many Southern whites are not very far from the back of the line themselves. Yet they have strong motives to distance themselves from the most needy and disdain government dependency, although they do use programs for which they qualify. That emotional distancing helps explain why they “identify up,” voting with the white rich even when the latter are enriching themselves at the expense of the majority. It also explains why they oppose Obamacare, even though it makes health insurance more affordable for millions who are not poor. They did not succeed in stopping the expansion of Medicaid in Louisiana, once it was championed by the new Democratic governor. A recent LSU study concluded that the additional $1.8 billion in federal spending on health care created thousands of jobs and had a $3.5 billion economic impact on the state. In general, poor red states like Louisiana receive more federal dollars than their residents pay in taxes.

Cultural marginalization

In addition to feeling both economically challenged and threatened by less deserving competitors, Tea Party supporters also feel that their cultural norms and values are under attack. Since the 1960s and 70s, the mainstream culture has been moving away from them in several respects.

The government no longer endorses and enforces Christian norms as much as it used to. Gone are official prayers in public schools, laws against contraception and abortion, strict divorce laws, and anti-sodomy statutes. This too has alienated Christian conservatives from their government.

In Lake Charles, religious teachings “focus more on a person’s moral strength to endure than on the will to change the circumstances that called on that strength.” This conservative brand of religion helps explain why even people who personally experience environmental disasters look to God for answers instead of to government. That puts them at odds with most of the environmental movement, although some evangelicals are starting to see good stewardship of the earth as part of their religious obligations.

When women joined the “long parade of the underprivileged” to call for equal rights, it was experienced by many conservative men as another threat to their precarious economic position. It was experienced by many conservative women as a disparagement and rejection of their traditional, and perhaps God-given, role as homemakers. Family variations that liberals see as liberation from a “one-size-fits-all” family system strike conservatives as the “breakdown of the family.”

The 1960s also saw immigration reforms that ended the quotas favoring Europeans, opening the country to more Asians, Africans and Latin Americans. Whereas establishment conservatives have often welcomed the cheap labor, Tea Party conservatives more often see the new immigrants as unwelcome competitors for jobs and as carriers of alien cultures.

All this puts white Christians on the defensive, especially the Southern, white, Christian males who are the primary supporters of right-wing conservatism. The two main political parties used to disagree mainly over economic policy. Since the cultural revolution of the 1960s, they have come to disagree over deeply emotional cultural issues as well.

Political propaganda

Hochschild says that the deep story her subjects tell is “also the Fox News deep story.” She describes a man who supported environmental causes, but also put up lawn signs for a candidate who wanted to cut the EPA. One reason was that “his source of news was limited to Fox News and videos and blogs exchanged by right-wing friends, which placed him in an echo chamber of doubts about the EPA, the federal government, the president, and taxes.”

Right-wing messages appeal to people for many different reasons:

You may assume that powerful right-wing organizers—pursuing their financial interests—“hook” right-wing grassroots adherents by appealing to the bad angels of their nature—their greed, selfishness, racial intolerance, homophobia, and desire to get out of paying taxes that go to the unfortunate. As I saw at the Trump rally in New Orleans, some of that appeal goes on. But that appeal obscures another—to the right wing’s good angels—their patience in waiting in line in scary economic times, their capacity for loyalty, sacrifice, and endurance—qualities of the deep story self.

If we can cross the “empathy divide” and relate to conservatives as human beings, we can avoid dismissing them as stupid or evil. They are standing up for what they deeply believe to be right, even if they create or perpetuate problems for other people by doing so.

Having said that, I still worry that political propaganda may be threatening our democratic institutions, as indicated by the success of Fox News and the election of a master propagandist as president. Much of the blame for that goes to the abundance of dark money in politics and the fragmentation of media by cable TV and the internet. Our society makes it awfully easy to promote extremism. But I also suspect that the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 70s, much of which I support, ushered in an era of unusual emotionalism in our politics, making people much too susceptible to emotional appeals unsupported by rational, fact-based arguments. Something is lost if deep stories do indeed remove judgment and fact. Hochschild’s sociology of emotions may reflect the times as well as illuminate them. In a previous post, I expressed some concerns about the extraordinary weight Jonathan Haidt gives to intuitions in The Righteous MindI don’t doubt that people vote their deep feelings, but I think that educators and other responsible leaders should be encouraging people to examine their feelings, not just catering to them.

My next post will deal with Hochschild’s take on the rise of Donald Trump and possible liberal responses to far-right conservatism.

Continued