The Death and Life of the Great American School System (part 2)

November 14, 2012

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Diane Ravitch has changed from a supporter to a critic of the “market-based” approach to school reform that has been so popular in recent years. She is especially critical of “No Child Left Behind,” the reforms proposed by George W. Bush and enacted into law in 2002. Ravitch calls it “the worst education legislation ever passed by Congress” and claims that “its remaining supporters are few.”

The law set a goal for all students to be “proficient” in reading and math by 2014. This was an ambitious aim, considering that the National Assessment of Educational Progress found only about one-third of students proficient at the time. The law mandated that states test public school students in grades three through eight each year and break down the test scores by race, ethnicity, income, disability status, and English proficiency. Schools and school districts then had to show that they were making “adequate yearly progress” (AYP) toward proficiency for every subgroup. Ravitch describes the consequences of failure:

Any school that did not make adequate progress for every subgroup toward the goal of 100 percent proficiency would be labeled a school in need of improvement (SINI). It would face a series of increasingly onerous sanctions. In the first year of failing to make AYP, the school would be put on notice. In the second year, it would be required to offer all its students the right to transfer to a successful school, with transportation paid from the district’s allotment of federal funds. In the third year, the school would be required to offer free tutoring to low-income students, paid from the district’s federal funds. In the fourth year, the school would be required to undertake “corrective action,” which might mean curriculum changes, staff changes, or a longer school day or year. If a school missed its targets for any subgroup for five consecutive years, it would be required to “restructure.”

Schools that were required to restructure had five options: convert to a charter school; replace the principal and the staff; relinquish control to private management; turn over control of the school to the state; or “any other major restructuring of the school’s governance.” (Most states and districts ended up choosing the last, most ambiguous alternative, hoping to avoid the other prospects.)

Although annual testing was a federal mandate, states were free to set their own standards and design their own tests. Not surprisingly, states varied enormously in their standards of proficiency, and many were able to raise scores on state tests without demonstrating real increases in proficiency on national tests. “Most states reported heartening progress almost every year. Mississippi claimed that 89 percent of its fourth graders were at or above proficiency, but according to NAEP [National Assessment of Educational Progress], only 18 percent were.” The racial gap in achievement narrowed less after No Child Left Behind went into effect than it had been narrowing in previous decades.

In separate chapters, Ravitch points out the weaknesses in key elements of reform: school choice, standardized testing, and teacher accountability. A different school can sometimes be a better school, so being able to choose a new school can be a solution for some children. Whether school choice is a systemic solution, however, depends on whether the schools that start up or gain students are generally superior to the schools that close down or lose students, and there Ravitch doesn’t find the evidence convincing. Early supporters of school choice, such as Milton Friedman and Ronald Reagan, advocated vouchers that children could use in any school; that proposal ran into significant opposition from those who didn’t want public money going to private, often religious schools. Since the 1990s, supporters of choice have campaigned primarily for charter schools, privately managed but nonsectarian schools operating with state resources and authorization. The hope is that they can become models of educational innovation, unencumbered by the constraints of public bureaucracies and teachers’ unions. Making a fair comparison of charter schools and traditional public schools is not easy, because charter schools often have demographic and/or financial advantages. “Charters often get additional financial resources from their corporate sponsors, enabling them to offer smaller classes, after-school enrichment activities, and laptop computers for every student.” Although charters are expected to admit disadvantaged students, students have to apply to get in, often by participating in a lottery, a process that tends to attract more motivated students. Charters may also rid themselves of problem cases more easily, since they are freer to make demands on students (such as longer school hours and stricter discipline) without worrying about the ones who give up and leave. So while some charter schools are very successful, the success is often more attributable to the selectivity of the student body rather than the superiority of private management. The well-regarded charter schools in Boston were found to have fewer students with special needs or English-language deficiencies. At the other end of the spectrum, some charters “were operated by minimally competent providers who collected public money while offering bare-bones education to gullible students.” Several national studies have concluded that on the average, charter schools have not outperformed traditional public schools. Schools with private management and non-union teachers have not been found to do a better job of educating the students at greatest risk of failure. But they have benefited from a blizzard of positive publicity, including the popular movie Waiting for Superman, promoted with a $2 million contribution from Bill Gates. Ravitch says, “The question for the future is whether the continued growth of charter schools in urban districts will leave regular public schools with the most difficult students to educate, thus creating a two-tier system of widening inequality.” If so, No Child Left Behind will be nothing but an empty–albeit highly effective–marketing slogan.

Perhaps the most common complaint about No Child Left Behind is that it has placed standardized testing at the center of public education and forced teachers to “teach to the test.” According to Ravitch, “The intense pressure generated by demands for accountability leads many educators and school officials to boost the scores in ways that have nothing to do with learning.” Research studies have called into question the dramatic improvements in scores reported in New York City under Mayor Bloomberg, in Texas under Governor Bush, and in Chicago under Arne Duncan, who became President Obama’s Secretary of Education. As noted earlier, differences in scores can easily reflect differences in the testing and scoring process, or differences in the population of students taking the test. At best, reading scores differentiate good and poor readers, but not necessarily good and poor teachers, or good and poor schools. Even if standardized tests were adequate indicators of the quality of instruction, how No Child Left Behind uses them would still be troubling. One issue raised by sociologist Donald T. Campbell is that concentrating on narrow measures of performance tends to skew behavior away from other organizational goals. If reading and math scores are the sine qua non of pedagogical success, than everything else gets shortchanged. Ravitch is particularly distressed by the narrowing of the curriculum, as No Child Left Behind “ignored such important studies as history, civics, literature, science, the arts, and geography.” She also accuses the reformers of encouraging “‘punitive accountability’, where low scores provide a reason to fire the staff and close the school,” instead of “‘positive accountability’, where low scores trigger an effort to help the school.” This strikes me as being in the American tradition of “Social Darwinism,” where the losers are left to fend for themselves without help from the winners. That’s rather ironic, considering that No Child Left Behind was supposed to embody a new, “compassionate conservative” regard for poor children. Apparently no such compassion need apply to their hard-pressed teachers.

Teachers should, of course, be accountable for doing their jobs well, as should all employees. However, a system of external rewards and penalties, such as merit pay based on test scores, may not be as helpful as its advocates think. The National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University conducted an experimental study comparing teachers who were offered a bonus for raising test scores with a control group who weren’t, and found no overall difference between the groups. Maybe most teachers do their best for reasons other than external rewards. “Modern motivational theory recognizes the primacy of intrinsic motivation, not rewards and punishments. Those who are motivated by idealism, autonomy, and a sense of purpose actually perform better and work harder than those who hope for a bonus or fear being fired. Relying on extrinsic motivation…may actually hinder improvement, because people will work to make the target yet will lose sight of their goals as professionals.” Ravitch is more sympathetic to reformers who want to strengthen the teaching profession by setting high professional standards, attracting talented people, educating them in the pedagogical skills and subject content they need, and instilling in them a love of teaching. Unionization has contributed to professionalization by improving pay and working conditions and protecting teachers against firing for reasons unrelated to the quality of their work. (In the past, teachers have been terminated for such things as getting married, becoming pregnant, or supporting civil rights.) Advocates of privatization see unions as an obstacle to management-led reform, including the freedom to replace uncooperative or underperforming teachers. “After the passage of NCLB, efforts to improve teacher professionalism were swept away by the law’s singular focus on raising test scores.” Reformers began to question whether teacher certification, advanced degrees, or even teaching experience mattered, since they weren’t always good predictors of student test scores. Why not let a lot of people try teaching, and keep the ones who get the best results? Just rank the teachers, let the “best” ones teach as many students as possible, and the scores will go up across the board.

There are at least two problems with this reasoning. First is the measurement problem, the difficulty of isolating the quality of teaching from a multitude of factors affecting student performance. If this isn’t done, teachers who are doing as well as they can with the classes they’ve been assigned may rank low and lose their jobs. Statistical methods exist for “value-added assessment,” (measuring the value added by the individual teacher), but they require sophisticated analysis of multiple years of data. An even more fundamental problem is the logical fallacy of attributing systemic problems entirely to individual differences. No matter how challenging the job and how difficult the working conditions, some workers will manage to do better than others. Put soldiers into a losing war, and some individuals and units will fight better than others. It doesn’t follow that replacing some soldiers with others or giving out more medals to some than to others will win the war, as if training, equipment, weaponry, strategy, tactics and logistics don’t matter. One can always rank teachers on the basis of test scores, do a mental experiment in which everyone performs at the top quintile, and then declare that “teachers are everything,” as did Michelle Rhee, chancellor of the Washington, D.C. school system. Ravitch says, “This line of reasoning appealed to conservatives and liberals alike; liberals liked the prospect of closing the achievement gap, and conservatives liked the possibility that it would be accomplished with little or no attention to poverty, housing, unemployment, health needs, or other social and economic problems.” Ravitch knows of no actual school that has closed the racial achievement gap simply by taking teachers whose students have high average scores and assigning them to teach students with low average scores.

Continued


The Death and Life of the Great American School System

November 12, 2012

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Diane Ravitch. The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining Education (Basic Books, 2011)

If there’s one thing that Americans agree on, despite their division into opposing camps on so many social issues, it’s the importance of education. A well-educated population is believed to be essential to national prosperity and a high quality of life. The decline in the number of jobs that used to pay pretty well but didn’t require much education, such as many manufacturing jobs, has given new urgency to this issue. Everyone agrees that today’s job-seekers need a good education to compete for high-paying positions, and that a country needs an educated workforce to compete for a good slice of the global economic pie. (At the same time, one should not jump to the conclusion that more education is sufficient for either individual or national success. The country must also invest in the kinds of work that require education, and organize work to produce high-quality products as opposed to merely cheap ones.)

Americans also generally agree that American students are lagging behind students of many other nations in academic achievement, and that the nation’s school system is in need of serious reform. What kind of reform, however, is hotly contested. Diane Ravitch’s book analyzes the wave of “market-based” reform that has swept through public education since the 1990s, especially the “No Child Left Behind” mandates signed into law by George W. Bush in 2002. Ravitch, who served as Assistant Secretary of Education in the first Bush administration, supported this approach to reform until 2006, when she concluded that it was mostly a failure.

To get an initial sense of what market-based reform is all about, think of a school as a business. Its product is an educated child. Its consumers are the families with children to educate. Its administration is management, and its teachers are labor. Quality control is accomplished by testing. Market competition exists if families are free to send their children to more than one school, and schools and their teachers are allowed to succeed or fail on their merits. Assume that education consists of a few well-defined skills that children must acquire. Assume that pedagogical techniques for instilling those skills are available, and that the quality of teaching determines whether or not children acquire them. Assume that standardized tests can accurately assess student progress, and that good test scores reflect good teaching. Assume that the quality of education will improve if management is free to reward and promote good teachers, defined as those whose students test well, and terminate or withhold rewards from bad teachers. Quality will also improve if educational entrepreneurs are free to start new schools, children are free to switch to better schools, and new teachers can easily enter the profession to replace those who are more experienced but less effective.

This market-based or business model of education has broad appeal, and it has set the agenda for most of the educational reforms of the past quarter century: frequent standardized testing to measure progress and hold teachers accountable, teacher compensation based on “merit” instead of credentials or seniority, efforts to weaken unions and abolish tenure to make it easier to fire teachers, school choice to give families alternatives to failing schools, and privatization to free school managers from the constraints of public bureaucracies. Conservatives have embraced this agenda most enthusiastically because of their belief in free-market solutions. The movement reflected the “government-is-the-problem; the market-is-the-solution” mood of the Reagan-Bush era. Many liberals have embraced it as well, in the hope that such reforms can expand educational opportunity and close the achievement gaps between rich and poor, white and minority children. In theory, such reforms might create both a freer educational marketplace and a more democratic society.

Ravitch begins her story with the “standards movement” called for by the National Commission on Excellence in Education in its 1983 report, A Nation at Risk. The report documented the poor performance of American students on national and international assessments and attributed much of it to weaknesses in curriculum content. The main solution was to set higher standards for both students and teachers. Some efforts to define national curricular standards followed, but the movement foundered when the attempt to set national standards for the teaching of history got caught up in the culture wars. Liberals proposed a more critical approach to American history emphasizing the struggles of disadvantaged groups for social justice, while conservatives preferred a more celebratory approach featuring the accomplishments of great (white) men. Ravitch feels that the advocates of national content standards gave up too easily when Congress and the media roundly rejected the proposed standards. What we got instead was a narrow focus on reading and math skills, with little regard for any substantive curriculum whatsoever.

In the 1990s, a particular New York City school district, District 2 covering part of Manhattan, got a national reputation for effectiveness in raising reading scores. The district superintendent, Anthony Alvarado, mandated a specific reading program, “Balanced Literacy,” which he implemented with intensive teacher training, close monitoring of instruction, and heavy commitments of class time. The San Diego school system then brought Alvarado in as chancellor for instruction and implemented a similar program citywide, concentrating on both reading and math. This was done from the top down, with heavy-handed tactics by top administrators, demotions and firings for uncooperative principles, and high attrition of teachers. The San Diego experiment in turn became a model for the New York City reform effort launched by Mayor Michael Bloomberg and Chancellor Joel Klein. “They reorganized the management of the schools, battled the teachers’ union, granted large pay increases to teachers and principals, pressed for merit pay, opened scores of charter schools, broke up large high schools into small ones, emphasized frequent practice for state tests, gave every school a letter grade, closed dozens of low-performing schools, and institutionalized the ideas of choice and competition.”

According to Ravitch, none of these experiments was as clearly successful as its proponents claimed. Rising test scores can mean improved instruction, but they can also mean changes in the tests themselves or their scoring, or demographic changes in the students taking the test. District 2 “was one of the most affluent districts in the city and became even more so during Alvarado’s tenure,” with a rising proportion of white and Asian students. At the time when San Diego’s scores were rising, they were rising just as much or even more in other areas of the state without the same reforms. And in New York City, test scores were “hugely inflated by the state’s secret decision to lower the points needed to advance on state tests.” When students were tested on the more objective National Assessement of Educational Progress, most tests showed no improvement, and the achievement gap among racial groups remained just as wide. Nevertheless, favorable media attention and strong financial backing from private foundations (especially those controlled by Bill & Melinda Gates, the Walton family, and Eli Broad) helped turn this approach to educational reform into a national movement. The centerpiece of that movement was No Child Left Behind.

Continued


How to Call the Presidential Election

November 2, 2012

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On election night, the media will no doubt provide us with a blizzard of numbers and instant interpretations. What I’ll be trying to do is ignore a lot of the trivia and focus on the most significant information. If I hear that Romney has won Kentucky, I’ll pay little attention, but if I hear that Obama has won North Carolina, I’ll declare him the winner and go to bed.

Some news organizations, such as CBS News, have continued to declare the race a dead heat. And it’s true that the national polls have been very close, with some favoring Obama and some favoring Romney by small margins. But statistical analysts who incorporate more information into their models, including state polls and economic indicators, give the President a 75-85% chance of winning. I’ll be relying heavily on Nate Silver’s model as a guide to what to look for on election night, but other models are saying essentially the same thing.

Silver sees Obama with a solid core of 237 electoral votes from states that the model gives him at least a 90% chance of winning. These include several states that are sometimes mentioned as being still in play, especially Pennsylvania, Michigan and Minnesota. One very plausible path to victory is for Obama to pick up Ohio, Wisconsin and Nevada for a total of 271, one more than the 270 electoral votes needed to win. That’s not Obama’s only winning path, but I’ll use it as a baseline scenario to compare with what actually happens election night.

So here’s my strategy for keeping score: Start from 271 Obama votes. Add the votes for any of the following states that go blue: Colorado (9), Florida (29), Iowa (6), New Hampshire (4), North Carolina (15), and Virginia (13). Subtract the votes for any of the following states that go red: Nevada (6), Ohio (18), and Wisconsin (10). As long as the additions are greater than or equal to the subtractions, project Obama the winner. If the subtractions are greater than the additions, project Romney the winner. Obviously, the projection will become more realistic as more returns from these swing states come in.

If at some point, the additions are greater than the remaining possible subtractions, Obama will almost certainly have won. I say “almost” because Romney could theoretically still win by cutting into Obama’s core of 237 votes. But that’s a long shot; if Romney can’t win in the swing states listed above, he’s even less likely to win in bluer states in Obama’s core. If at some point, the subtractions are greater than the remaining possible additions, then Romney will prevail.

So have fun, impress your friends by calling the race early, and have a good night’s sleep!


Stockman Critique of Bain Capital

October 18, 2012

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This week’s Newsweek contains an excerpt from David Stockman’s forthcoming book, The Great Deformation: How Crony Capitalism Corrupts Free Markets and Democracy. Stockman is no leftist; he was Ronald Reagan’s budget director and remains an advocate for free-market capitalism. He has worked in private equity firms himself for many years. That makes his critique of Bain Capital all the more powerful. His article is available online at The Daily Beast.

The centerpiece of Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign is his assertion that he knows how to create jobs because of his experience as CEO of Bain Capital. Stockman is hardly the first to question whether Bain’s private equity investments had very much to do with job creation, but his conclusion is especially blunt:

Mitt Romney was not a businessman; he was a master financial speculator who bought, sold, flipped, and stripped businesses. He did not build enterprises the old-fashioned way–out of inspiration, perspiration, and a long slog in the free market fostering a new product, service, or process of production. Instead, he spent his 15 years raising debt in prodigious amounts on Wall Street so that Bain could purchase the pots and pans and castoffs of corporate America, leverage them to the hilt, gussy them up as reborn “roll-ups,” and then deliver them back to Wall Street for resale–the faster the better.

In a leveraged buyout, a private equity firm such as Bain Capital buys a company by putting up some of its own capital and borrowing the rest. The ratio of debt to equity can be very high, often 90/10 or more. The assets of the acquired company become collateral for the debt, and debt payments are made from the company’s cash flow. This arrangement limits the potential losses of the private equity firm, since it can only lose the equity it put in. But the potential gains are much larger, since any appreciation of company value goes to the new owner, not to the lenders, in the same way that appreciation on your home goes to you when you sell, not to the bank that lent you the money to buy. Acquire a $100 million company using only $10 million of your own money, and if it appreciates by 10% your gain is 100% of your investment–that’s leverage!

In theory, a leveraged buyout can result in a win-win. Ideally, the new owners come in and turn the company around, increasing its assets and cash flow and creating new jobs. When they eventually sell, perhaps taking it public with an IPO, they make a profit. The lenders get all their money back with interest. If that’s what happened most of the time, LBOs wouldn’t come in for so much criticism. But often, the private equity business is more like flipping real estate than building new companies. In what’s called a “buy, strip and flip” operation, the new owners don’t keep the company long enough to make real improvements in its long-term profitability. They just weigh it down with debt payments, extract as much cash as they can by cutting costs and selling off assets, maybe use an accounting trick or two to spruce up the balance sheet, and then unload it before its true financial condition becomes obvious. Stockman argues that government policies such as low tax rates on capital gains and the loose monetary policy of the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan enabled this corrupted form of capitalism. Flipping assets is most profitable when borrowed capital is readily available, capital gains are lightly taxed, and enough investors are playing the game to create asset bubbles with steadily rising prices.

Stockman places Bain capital squarely in that context:

Bain Capital is a product of the Great Deformation. It has garnered fabulous winnings through leveraged speculation in financial markets that have been perverted and deformed by decades of money printing and Wall Street coddling by the Fed. So Bain’s billions of profits were not rewards for capitalist creation; they were mainly windfalls collected from gambling in markets that were rigged to rise.

Romney’s time at Bain Capital coincided with “the first great Greenspan bubble, which crested at the turn of the century and ended in the thundering stock-market crash of 2000-02.” During that time, most of Bain’s deals earned a lower return than an investor could earn in an S & P 500 index fund. But the company’s ten best deals returned a profit of $1.8 billion on an investment of only $250 million. Four of those ten best deals ended in bankruptcy for the acquired company, indicating that Bain’s success did not depend on the success of its acquisitions. For example, Bain bought a lot of department stores and clothing chains that were threatened by the expansion of big-box stores like Wal-Mart. It had one of its acquisitions, Stage Stores Inc., in turn acquire another endangered chain, C.R. Anthony. Bain then touted the combined operation as a successful, expanding company, and quickly sold its stake at a $175 million profit (18 times what it invested) as soon as the stock went up. When the company, heavily laden with debt and still facing with the same competitive pressures, went bankrupt, about 5,000 jobs were lost.

Bain invested in more successful companies as well, but it rarely made as much on the deal. It provided $5 million in seed money for Staples, from which it made a $15 million profit. Staples went on to become the retail giant of the office-supply business, with a workforce of 90,000. Stockman notes, however, that this mainly represented a transfer of jobs from smaller stationery and office-supply stores that Staples either acquired or put out of business. (He also notes that about 45% of the jobs at Staples are now part-time.) Stockman’s point is not to blame Bain for the transition from small retail stores to big-box stores, which has produced economies of scale and lower prices for consumers. The point is that the Bain business model was indifferent to job creation. Bain could “buy, strip and flip” the losers or invest in the winners, making money either way. Knowing how to play this speculative game for short-term profit is not at all the same as knowing how to create new jobs in a competitive global economy.

Liberals will probably feel that Stockman places too much of the blame for deforming capitalism on government monetary and tax policy, and not enough on corporations’ own tendencies to pursue private profit at the expense of public good. But both liberals and conservatives may agree with Stockman’s main contention, that experience with this peculiar kind of capitalism isn’t a very good qualification for the presidency:

In short, this is a record about a dangerous form of leveraged gambling that has been enabled by the failed central banking and taxing policies of the state. That it should be offered as evidence that Mitt Romney is a deeply experienced capitalist entrepreneur and job creator is surely a testament to the financial deformations of our times.


Twilight of the Elites (part 3)

October 17, 2012

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Having described in some detail how meritocracies degenerate into self-serving oligarchies, Chris Hayes ends his book with a brief discussion of what might be done about it. Although his subtitle, America After Meritocracy, suggests that he wants to destroy meritocracy, he explains that he wants only to reform it. “At its most basic, the logic of ‘meritocracy’ is ironclad: putting the most qualified, best equipped people into the positions of greatest responsibility and import. It would be foolhardy to toss this principle out in its entirety.” This sounds almost like the collison of an irresistible force and an immovable object; we have both the “ironclad logic” of meritocracy in principle and the “iron law” of its corruption in practice! So what’s to be done? Resist the corruption by keeping inequality from getting out of hand:

If you don’t concern yourself at all with equality of outcomes, you will, over time, produce a system with horrendous inequality of opportunity. This is the paradox of meritocracy: It can only truly come to flower in a society that starts out with a relatively high degree of equality. So if you want meritocracy, work for equality. Because it is only in a society which values equality of actual outcomes, one that promotes the commonweal and social solidarity, that equal opportunity and earned mobility can flourish.

Hayes makes clear that he is speaking primarily of economic equality. Although he acknowledges other sources of power besides money–political office, platform (being in a position to address a large audience), social networks–he sees these as highly correlated. For example, candidates who run for office usually need to have a lot of money of their own as well as the social connections to raise it from other wealthy people. And the wealthy generally have their way: Research in political science finds that actual policy outcomes correlate highly with the desires of the wealthy and hardly at all with the desires of middle-income or poorer voters. Hayes regards the “1%” and the “governing class” as nearly the same group.

Hayes then endorses the classic liberal goal of economic redistribution through government taxing and spending. “As a general rule, the more taxation, the more redistribution; the more redistribution, the more equality.” He brings this ostensibly radical idea into the mainstream by citing surveys showing that Americans want wealth to be distributed far more evenly than it is, and that they favor raising taxes on the wealthy. He acknowledges how difficult this is to accomplish: “People and institutions who benefit most from extreme inequality have outsize power they can use to protect their gains from egalitarian incursions.” But he hopes that mobilizing the power of the majority can shift the political balance. He pins his hopes especially on a “newly radicalized upper middle class,” since their prospects for getting ahead have also been diminished by the self-serving policies that favor the 1%.

One thing that struck me about the book was how much politics and how little economics it contains. The author seems to see the world primarily as a struggle of social classes for control of the government, one class using it to consolidate their privileges and others to expand equality. That may be true, but it’s not the whole truth. America also faces a struggle to maintain and expand the wealth of the whole country. Having just read Arne Kalleberg’s Good Jobs, Bad Jobs, I’m interested in the question of how the United States is going to compete in the global economy. Will we join a race to the bottom, creating as many low-wage jobs as possible, or find a way to create better jobs for well-educated, highly trained workers? Government policies in areas like human capital development and investment in new industries may have implications both for reducing inequality and increasing national wealth and competitiveness. If so, framing the issue as redistribution for redistribution’s sake may be unnecessarily narrow and divisive. Hayes mentions the postwar era in which economic growth and increasing equality went hand in hand. Many leaders of that era realized that it was good for the economy for workers to earn enough to join the middle class. Similarly, we may all benefit if the nation develops the talents of all its citizens and the new industries to employ them. The result may be a society that is not only fairer, but more prosperous.