Two Nations Indivisible (part 3)

November 18, 2013

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Fears that Mexican immigration and free trade are costing U.S. citizens jobs and good wages appear exaggerated. Some losses do occur, but the studies cited by Shannon O’Neil indicate that they are offset by economic gains due mainly to the expansion of Mexican and Mexican-American markets for U.S. goods and services. However, another fear helps sustain divisions between the two countries–fear of lawlessness arising from drug-related violence and political corruption south of the border. While the violence and corruption are real, O’Neil reports a general movement toward democracy and the rule of law in Mexico. She believes that trying to maintain walls between the countries will impede rather than assist this movement.

Democratization

The Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI) held power in Mexico for the last 71 years of the twentieth century, maintaining its one-party rule through a patronage system that traded economic benefits for loyalty. Opposition to the PRI developed after the 1982 debt crisis and 1985 Mexico City earthquake overwhelmed its ability to provide economic security. The party managed to cling to power for a time, with the help of some electoral irregularities, a temporarily improved economy and support from the United States. Then another financial crisis in 1995 forced the devaluation of the peso, resulting in runaway inflation and high unemployment. The PRI suffered large losses in the 1997 midterm elections, and lost the presidency in 2000 to Vicente Fox of the National Action Party (PAN). The 1996 electoral reform had already created a more independent Federal Electoral Institute. Now other reforms followed, especially a freedom of information law and some police and judicial reforms. “By the second decade of the twenty-first century, Mexico’s electoral democracy was firmly established. On nearly every comparative international measure of democracy, Mexico ranks in the upper tiers.” The country has moved to a competitive three-party system with an independent judiciary and press.

Mexican democracy is not without its limitations. Some local states and municipalities still have entrenched political leaders with limited accountability, sometimes using their offices for their own enrichment. The distribution of economic rewards is extremely unequal, with monopolies and oligopolies controlling many sectors, and wealthy individuals and corporations paying very low taxes by international standards. “Perhaps the greatest challenge to Mexico’s democracy today is its weak rule of law. Mexico suffers still from the twin evils of corruption and impunity. These benefit not only hardened criminals, but also Mexico’s connected families and prominent politicians–as might often overcomes right.”

Drugs and violence

O’Neil calls Mexico’s rising insecurity “a real illness with the wrong prescription.” Violence is all too common, but its causes and remedies are often misunderstood. Much of it is confined to specific cities south of the border and related to the drug trade–not just to the drug trade in general but to some particular directions it has taken in recent years.

One thing that happened was that crackdowns on the drug trade elsewhere created new opportunities for Mexican criminals:

During the 1980s and 1990s,…the United States poured billions into securing the southeastern seaboard through the Caribbean. It also began working more closely with Colombia— going after well-known drug kingpins and dismantling the large cartels on their home turf. And so the trade and transit shifted to Mexico.

In addition, Mexican political reforms upset the cozy relationships that sometimes existed between PRI officials and drug dealers, creating opportunities for new dealers to fight for their piece of the action. The results were an intensification of drug-related violence and the emergence of new Mexican drug cartels that now dominate the flow of drugs to the U.S.  In 2006, President Calderon launched a military crackdown that may ultimately reduce the traffic, but in the short run added to the violence. Gradual police and judicial reform will also help, but so far the rule of law remains relatively weak, and major crimes are often prosecuted less vigorously than petty crimes.

O’Neil sees the United States as part of the problem as well as part of the ultimate solution. Surveys of drug use establish the U.S. as the world’s largest consumer of marijuana and cocaine. Most of what the country spends to combat drugs goes to curb the supply, although studies show that reducing demand through treatment programs is more cost-effective. Drug traffickers rely heavily on businesses north of the border to launder their drug proceeds, as well as on U.S. arms merchants to provide them with guns. About 70% of Mexico’s illegal guns come from the U.S.

Mexico needs the cooperation and assistance of the United States to investigate criminal activity, curb drug demand as well as supply, regulate the flow of weapons, and continue to foster mutual economic development so that disadvantaged youth have alternatives to participation in the drug business.

O’Neil’s Two Nations Indivisible encourages us to see beyond the latest sensational headlines to the deeper economic and political changes that may be creating a strong new democracy on our border. Someday we may have no more reason to fear the Mexicans to the south than the Canadians to the north.


Two Nations Indivisible (part 2)

November 15, 2013

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In reflecting on Shannon O’Neil’s account of U.S.-Mexican relations, I was struck by the similarity between the choices facing international policymakers and those facing investors. Financial planners have often identified two enemies of sound investment–fear and greed. Fear leads an investor to flee from the ups and downs of the market by sticking to only the safest and most predictable of investments, thus settling for too low a return. Greed leads an investor to chase extravagant returns that often turn out to be illusory. Most sensible investors neither bet the farm on the latest hot stock, hoping to make a killing, nor run for the exits at the first sign of trouble. They maintain a diversified portfolio of assets with calm confidence that they will receive their fair share of a growing economy’s benefits.

Fear and greed have often characterized U.S. attitudes towards Mexico and Mexicans. Those who would close the door to migration and trade are afraid that Mexicans will take our jobs, undermine our culture, or become a burden on taxpayers. And some of those who advocate more open policies are greedy for one-sided economic relationships in which businesses exploit Mexican laborers and take advantage of their lack of rights. Having a poorer country with a weak democracy so near can be profitable, as U.S. businesses learned in the nineteenth century. Employing Mexican migrants in the U.S. while keeping them undocumented and vulnerable to deportation has also been profitable. With greater confidence in the future of both countries, we could base policies on the expectation that our peoples can prosper together, and that their relationship can be a win-win instead of a loss for one side or the other.

Mexican immigration

Compared to the brief spurts of immigration from countries like Ireland, Germany and Italy, Mexican immigration has been going on for a long time. Among the forces driving it have been “economic needs, demographic trends, and deep family and community connections on both sides of the border.” O’Neil says that a particularly large wave of immigration has occurred since the 1980s, but “this wave is already receding, and is unlikely to ever rise again.” Net immigration reached zero in 2011, with the U.S. economy still suffering from high unemployment, but the reasons for tapering immigration go deeper.

One cause of the recent wave of immigration was the 1982 Mexican debt crisis and its aftermath, which left unemployment higher in Mexico than the United States. A return to economic stability and growth, especially since the late 1990s, has alleviated the pressure to migrate. Another temporary factor was demographic. As in most developing nations, health improvements brought down the mortality rate–especially the infant mortality rate–and the surviving children were too numerous for the labor force to absorb. More recently, this population explosion has been slowed by a dramatic decline in the birth rate, with the average number of children per family dropping from about six to two since the 1970s. O’Neil also notes that as fewer young adults enter the Mexican labor force, the large baby-boom generation will be leaving the U.S. labor force, so migrant laborers may be seen as less of a threat and more of a blessing.

Many readers may be surprised to read that “nearly all economists agree that immigration presents a net benefit for the U.S. economy and for U.S. wages.” The harm that migrants may do by taking low-wage jobs may get most of the attention, but everything migrants add must be factored into the equation:

[T]he U.S. job market is not a zero-sum game. Immigrants and their families help spur growth and new jobs by buying groceries, going out to dinner, and shopping at the local mall. Also, long-time locals and new arrivals gravitate toward different jobs. U.S.-born workers are more likely to serve food in restaurants, check out shoppers as retail clerks, check in families at hotel front desks, hold manufacturing jobs, or manage construction or janitorial crews that have less-than-perfect English. In fact, study after study shows that foreign-born and native workers more often complement than substitute for one another.

States with large immigrant populations do not generally have either lower wages or higher unemployment than other states. Some groups of workers may be hurt by immigrant competition, especially men with a high school education or less, but the impact on wages is generally small.  And where wages are held down, the solution may be to upgrade the status and rights of workers rather than trying to get rid of them.

Academics also find that the pressure on low-skill wages stems not from immigration per se, but from the illegal nature of so many of today’s arrivals, which allows unscrupulous employers to underpay, undercut, and underprotect employees. One such study suggests that if immigrants were legalized, wages for all workers— citizens and noncitizens alike— on the bottom educational rungs would increase rather than fall.

O’Neil also debunks the claims of some cultural conservatives that Hispanic immigrants are less assimilable than earlier waves of immigrants. She finds the Mexican story similar to those of other ethnicities: the first generation struggles and clings to many of its traditions, while the next generations quickly adapt. Ninety percent of second-generation Hispanics speak English very well, and educational attainment approaches the national average by the third generation. Assimilation weakens many other traditions too, such as the close-knit Hispanic family: “Native-born Hispanics now divorce their partners just as frequently as native-born whites (three times the rate of recent immigrants.” (Not everyone’s idea of progress, but at least it shows assimilation!)

O’Neil concludes that recent immigration policy has been based too heavily on unfounded fears. The benefits of trying to exclude immigrants are too meager and the costs too high. Now that the border has been “hardened,” many immigrants who might have made the crossing more easily still manage to get here anyway, but with the aid of organized crime. The proportion of immigrants who settle here permanently instead of temporarily has risen, perhaps because border enforcement has made traveling back and forth too difficult. Economic studies have concluded that rounding up and deporting undocumented workers would be extremely expensive, and would actually shrink the economy of any state that accomplished it.

O’Neil would maintain the distinction between legal and illegal immigration, and even enforce laws against the employment of undocumented workers more strictly. However, she would allow more immigrants into the legal category, for example by making it easier for relatives of Mexican-Americans to be admitted. She would also provide more avenues to citizenship for migrants who are working here legally.

Free trade

O’Neil regards the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a “net win for both countries.” Since its approval, Mexico’s exports to the United States have increased by a factor of five, but U.S. exports to Mexico also increased by a factor of four. Mexico is now second only to Canada as an importer of U.S. products.

The free trade agreement made it much easier for U.S. firms to invest in Mexican production and then import the products back to the United States. That aroused the fear voiced by presidential candidate Ross Perot of a “giant sucking sound” as jobs were lured south of the border. While many manufacturing jobs did go south, they were offset–maybe a little more than offset–by jobs created by U.S. production for the expanding Mexican market. And while more Mexicans did find jobs in booming border cities, workers in small-scale farming and other traditional employment lost work as markets became more open to international competititon.

If the impact on overall employment has been modest, the benefits for economic growth, income and consumption have been large, especially in Mexico. Mexican per capita income more than doubled between 1996 and 2011, while the new flood of manufactured goods dramatically reduced the cost of consumer goods.

The main effect of free trade has been to closely integrate the two economies in processes of production and distribution. For many products, the distinction between “made in America” and “made in Mexico” is no longer meaningful because workers in both countries do the making. “The Chevy Malibu sold in Omaha, Nebraska, may have crossed the border not once but multiple times, as parts combine into components, components into systems or modules, and finally modules into cars. Every Ford Fiesta sold in Guanajuato, Mexico, is no different.”

Continued


Two Nations Indivisible

November 14, 2013

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Shannon K. O’Neil. Two Nations Indivisible: Mexico, the United States, and the Road Ahead. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.

The title gets straight to the heart of the matter. The author’s thesis is that Mexico and the United States have become irrevocably interconnected, although neither public opinion nor public policy have entirely come to terms with that fact. They stand to gain more than they lose from acknowledging their ties and working together on the economic and political issues that affect them both. “Perhaps no other nation affects the United States on a day-to-day basis as much as Mexico. Geography, environment, companies, supply chains, people, communities, beliefs, and cultures bind together the two nations and their futures.”

Shannon O’Neil is Senior Fellow for Latin America studies at the Council for Foreign Relations.

Mexico is a country of 116 million people, the second largest (after Brazil) in Latin America as well as the second largest (after the U.S.) in North America. Public opinion in the U.S. may focus primarily on Mexico’s problems–poverty and drug-related violence–but that misses the bigger picture: “Mexico’s real story today is one of ongoing economic, political, and social transformation led by a rising middle class, increasingly demanding voters, and enterprising individuals and organizations working to change their country from the inside.” O’Neil is not saying that Mexico’s future is assured, but only that it has come far enough to have a decent shot at democracy and prosperity. She describes the country as being at a crossroads, facing two possible futures: “It could evolve into a highly developed democracy such as Spain, or it could deteriorate into a weak and unreliable state, dependent on and hostage to a drug economy, an Afghanistan.”

Which would we rather have as a neighbor sharing a thousand-mile border, a Spain or an Afghanistan? On the one hand the U.S. could have the security of an alliance with a strong democracy and the financial rewards of trade with a strong economy. On the other hand it could have larger waves of poor migrants pouring into the country and prohibitive security expenses. “The troops and resources required to secure the U.S.-Mexico border from drug traffickers, migrants, and terrorists would far outstrip those sent to Afghanistan or Iraq.” O’Neil considers policies based on fear alone unrealistic and counterproductive. Trying to wall ourselves off from Mexico geographically, economically and politically will make it harder for Mexico to become the kind of country the U.S. would prefer it to be.

Historically, the United States has had a very troubled relationship with Mexico, often characterized by political and military dominance, uneven economic benefits, and mutual suspicion. After Mexico’s independence from Spain in 1821, the U.S. took advantage of its political weakness to acquire large chunks of its territory, including the border states of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California, as well as parts of Colorado, Utah and Kansas. The U.S. intervened in Mexican affairs on a number of occasions, partly to protect its economic interests against interventions from European nations. Mexico was especially open to U.S. investment during the Porfiriata, the long rule of General Porfirio Diaz (1884-1911), resulting in substantial U.S. control over Mexico’s resources, with profits primarily for U.S. businesses and a small Mexican elite. After the civil war that began in 1910, Mexico struggled to regain domestic control over its resources, culminating in the nationalization of the oil industry in 1938.

For much of the twentieth century, relations between the two countries were rather distant and mutually suspicious. The United States allowed Mexicans into the country when it needed their labor, as it did during and after World War II, but excluded them when jobs were scarce, as in the Great Depression. In Mexico, the ruling political party for over seventy years, the PRI, “justified its own excesses as necessary for defending the nation against the ‘Yanquis’ next door.” And yet the forces that would eventually strengthen interconnection were already operating. Mexico relied on U.S. capital investments to modernize the economy. Rapid population growth and displacement from traditional occupations encouraged Mexicans to seek jobs to the north. The bracero guest-worker program (1942-64) allowed millions of Mexicans to establish a foothold in the U.S., which encouraged many others to follow legally or illegally.

The recent history of U.S.-Mexican relations includes new forms of cooperation, but also new insecurities and resistance to closer ties. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) created a path to citizenship for over two million undocumented immigrants. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signed in 1992 reduced trade barriers, with complex and controversial results to be discussed later. Since 2000, however, security concerns and economic fears have come to the forefront, and U.S. public opinion about Mexico has turned more negative. The comprehensive immigration reform proposed by George W. Bush failed to get through Congress [and the one proposed by Barack Obama also faces serious opposition]. Positions on these issues don’t divide neatly along party lines. On immigration reform, pro-business Republicans are more supportive than culturally conservative Tea Partiers. On free trade, “blue-dog” Democrats are more supportive than pro-labor Democrats concerned about the potential loss of domestic jobs.

Whether the United States stands to gain or lose from closer ties with Mexico depends on what Mexico is believed to offer. If it offers only drugs, violence, economic dependency and subsistence wage labor, then the losses might outweigh the gains. But in O’Neil’s view, that is not the Mexico that is coming to be:

Ask most Americans— and not a few Mexicans— about Mexico and they will emphasize poverty, corruption, and violence. Though not patently false, these views are misleadingly incomplete. Poverty continues, but the middle class now outnumbers the poor. Corruption is widespread, but Mexico is more transparent today than at any time in its past. Violence, though widespread, is still concentrated, and Mexico is taking steps that, if they continue, will stabilize and deepen its democratic rule of law— the building blocks for long-lasting security. Lost in the headlines, Mexico’s real story today is one of fundamental political, economic, and social transformation: from authoritarianism to democracy, from a closed to an open economy, and from a poor society to a middle class nation. Mexico’s hard-fought changes are creating a very different country on the southern U.S. border.

Later posts will explore several aspects of U.S.-Mexican relations in more detail: immigration, economic development, democratization and drug-related violence.

Continued


America’s Right (part 3)

October 25, 2013

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Robert B. Horwitz analyzes the Tea Party as the latest expression of anti-establishment conservatism, a political force that has been around for a long time but has gained support since the decline of the postwar liberal consensus in recent decades. Two particular movements discussed in the previous post–the new religious right and neoconservatism–had largely taken control of the Republican Party by 2000, and their ideas were especially influential in the George W. Bush administration. However, “the Bush presidency…left the country with two long-running, unfinished wars on its hands, a colossal rise in the federal debt, and the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression.” In 2008, the election of Barack Obama gave control of the White House and both houses of Congress (briefly) to the Democrats. The Tea Party emerged in 2009 as an outraged response on the part of extreme conservatives to this sudden change of fortune.

The Tea Party reacted especially strongly to several of the new administration’s policies that they saw as “socialist”: the Troubled Asset Relief Program that lent money to shaky financial institutions (actually initiated under the previous administration), the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act that spent $787 billion to create jobs and stimulate the economy, and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to subsidize health insurance for uninsured Americans. The Tea Party was successful in electing more Republicans in the 2010 midterm election, many of whom openly identified with Tea Party positions.

Demographically, Tea Party supporters are more likely than most voters to be white, male, over 45, evangelical Protestant, Southern or Western, and either Republican or independent. Many have been small business owners. Ideologically, they seem to draw primarily on the libertarian strain in conservative thinking, strongly critical of taxation and business regulation. Tea Party candidates “advocated the continuation of the Bush tax cuts, the repeal of the estate tax, and the replacement of the progressive income tax with a flat tax or national sales tax.” (The “Tea” in Tea Party is also an acronym for “Taxed Enough Already.”) Sometimes they question the very legitimacy of taxation, suggesting that taxing personal income for anything but the most basic government functions amounts to criminal theft. Sometimes they reject modern government agencies–such as the Federal Reserve Board and the Environmental Protection Agency–as unconstitutional, since the Constitution doesn’t specifically authorize them.

Horwitz warns against focusing on Tea Party libertarianism to the point of missing the religious element in the movement. “Accompanying the Tea Party plea to restore genuine capitalism is also a call to restore genuine Christianity.” Tea Partyers are attracted to the writings of W. Cleon Skousen, popularized by Fox News host Glenn Beck. Skousen claims that the inspiration for American principles of limited government came primarily from the Bible, not from the European Enlightenment, with the implication that the modern expansion of government is a deviation from the divinely ordained social order. Senate candidate Sharron Angle said, “Entitlement programs…make government our God.” (She lost, suggesting that associating Social Security with sin is a little much for most voters.) A more popular moral argument against Big Government is that dependency on government undermines personal responsibility.

Although the Tea Party does fuse libertarianism and moral traditionalism to a degree, the movement has not shown much support for the neoconservative moral crusade to bring democracy to other countries. “Neoconservatives are largely in eclipse in the current Tea Party movement,” which is mainly focused on domestic issues.

Horwitz’s analysis and critique of the Tea Party draws on the earlier work of Richard Hofstadter, who described a “paranoid style in American politics” in his effort to understand the popularity of Joe McCarthy and Barry Goldwater. Hofstadter suggested that their supporters were suffering not from real economic deprivation but from “status anxiety,” described in Horwitz’s words as “the psychological sense of loss of rank and place, of an intense feeling of victimhood, and the need to find and punish those responsible for this.” Hofstadter saw the roots of that status anxiety in a transformation of the American liberal tradition:

The New Deal…marked a striking departure from the Populist-Progressive heritage, in Hofstadter’s view. If the old liberalism had been Protestant and ideological, rooted in a backward agrarian ideal, the new liberalism was urban, ethnic, hospitable to non-Protestants, forward-looking, and results-oriented.

The status anxiety experienced by many rural Protestants was often accompanied by anti-intellectualism. Modernization meant new ideas, and new ideas called into question the authority of rural tradition, especially religious tradition. This current of anti-intellectualism surfaces today in the rejection of scientific views on evolution and climate change, and in the moralistic rejection of healthcare reform without regard to its actual consequences. Any number of recent social movements and trends could generate status anxiety in a typical Tea Partyer, such as an older, white, Southern, male, evangelical Protestant small business owner. How about the election of a younger, half-black, northern, liberal Protestant lawyer and community organizer?

Horwitz accepts much of Hofstadter’s analysis, but finds it incomplete. Anti-establishment conservatives may indeed suffer from status anxiety, but that doesn’t entirely explain their success in creating a movement that impacts political culture and decision-making. As a sociologist, Horwitz wants to focus on social institutions, not just psychological dispositions.

A starting point for this analysis is “the structural nature of political power within a mixed capitalist economy.” American society has a real power structure that arouses legitimate populist concerns about individual liberty. Yet participants in populist movements often misunderstand that structure, for example underestimating how much business and government cooperate to maintain a particular kind of capitalism. The Tea Party blamed “socialist” government for the bailout of the banks, but were remarkably forgiving of the financial institutions for the risky policies that brought them to the brink of bankruptcy in the first place. Tea Partyers largely overlook the possibility that modern government has to be big enough to regulate capitalism and protect citizens from the misadventures of the wealthy and powerful.

The bias of the state toward capitalist institutions is both structural and a mainstay of political culture….In times of grave economic crisis, during which the state acts to protect the socio-economic order through an unusual degree of intervention on behalf of capitalist institutions, some significant portion of the American citizenry becomes unnerved about individual autonomy–even when that intervention guards against further economic instability and even depression.

Horwitz’s institutional analysis also focuses on the institutions that anti-establishment conservatives built in order to spread and implement their ideas. These include fundraising networks, conservative media such as Fox News (encouraged by the Reagan administration’s abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine), and many political organizations. Here too, the neoconservatives and religious right prepared the way, especially by recruiting corporate contributors to the cause. Horwitz regards the Tea Party as a legitimate grassroots movement–not just “astroturf”–but it is heavily bankrolled by wealthy businessmen with their own pro-business/anti-government agenda, people who stand to gain from reductions in taxes and regulation. As a result, Tea Party policies “primarily serve the interests of corporate capitalism and the very wealthy,” although they are framed as supporting traditional American individualism.

Finally, Horwitz describes the dogmatism and utopianism of anti-establishment conservatism, which he regards as troublesome for a democratic society. In their zeal to defend their religion from evil government, some religious conservatives would erase the boundary between church and state and try to establish an overtly Christian state. For Horwitz, democracy requires striking a delicate balance between the sacred and the secular:

Democracy insures that people can practice religion freely; democracy must require the separation between church and state to be a democracy. That is the balance that must be struck in a democratic system: individuals can articulate religious arguments in the informal political public sphere, but as those arguments move into the formal institutional political realm they must be translated into secular, reasoned terms, in language and epistemic structure that are in principle accessible to all citizens.

Neoconservatism has also displayed dogmatism and utopianism, especially in its advocacy of global democracy established through American militarism. “The Iraq War was nothing if not a utopian project.”

The particular political phenomenon known as the Tea Party may be a temporary burst of outrage. The greater concern is the larger anti-establishment movement from which it came, and the dogmatic style that it brings to our politics. That style is more suited to opposing government than actually governing. And that, I might add, may explain a lot about today’s Republican Party.


America’s Right (part 2)

October 24, 2013

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Robert Horwitz’s America’s Right describes how the power of the Tea Party in today’s Republican Party developed out of a long tradition of anti-establishment conservatism, a tradition with roots in economic objections to the New Deal and Cold War fears of communism. The social and economic problems that fractured the postwar liberal consensus in the 1960s and 70s generated two conservative movements that brought anti-establishment conservatism into the political mainstream, especially the Republican mainstream. These were the new religious right and neoconservatism.

The religious right

Sociologists have described a process of secularization whereby religion and other social institutions become increasingly distinct and independent, creating the modern “separation of church and state.” Many theorists have expected religion to decline in public importance, retreating more and more into the private sphere of life. This would mean, in the words of Hugh Heclo, that “politics should be conducted on the basis of public reason (in principle accessible to all citizens) and not on the basis of religiously revealed truths or religiously sectarian teachings.” Public policy would be based increasingly on rational arguments supported by facts rather than religious beliefs.

However, making religion irrelevant to public policy is not as easy as it may sound. At the very least, Christians have hoped that their religious values, including the value they place on religious and other forms of liberty, will provide a cultural framework within which public goals are pursued. In addition, modernist and traditionalist disagreements over how Christians should see the world have been very relevant to their attitudes toward the state. In this connection, Horwitz discusses the distinction between postmillennialist and premillennialist versions of evangelical Protestant theology. Both views looked forward to a thousand-year reign of Christ before the end of the world, although the number of years wasn’t always taken literally. Postmillennialists thought that the second coming of Christ could occur after Christians had created an era of goodness through their good works in the world. Premillennialists thought that Christ had to come before goodness could prevail. The first view supported a more optimistic, modernist approach to the world, associated with the Social Gospel movement to improve society, often through political reform. The second view supported a more pessimistic, traditionalist approach, one that encouraged withdrawal from a sinful world and reliance on God, not government. “Traditionalists viewed the Social Gospel’s emphasis on good works and serving the poor as undercutting the elemental concern for repentance from sin and the dependence on God’s grace.”

In the nineteenth century, John Nelson Darby expounded an influential version of premillennialist theology that remains popular to this day:

Darby described Christ’s second coming as at the end of an apocalyptic period of “tribulation,” a period of war, famine, and social chaos during the seven-year rule of the Antichrist. The final battle of Armageddon focuses on the Jews and takes place in the biblical land of Israel. As the “end-times” unfold, true Christian believers and innocents are pulled from earth to heaven in the “Rapture.” Following Armageddon, Christ returns to establish a kingdom in Jerusalem, where he will reign for a thousand years.

Evangelical conservatism was especially strong in the South, perhaps because abolitionism was one of those liberal social movements that appealed more to religious optimists. Southern preachers countered that with a Biblical justification of slavery. If God allows slavery, who are we to change it?

Religious conservatism can provide a rationale for disengagement from the evil world and its politics, but also at times encourage active engagement to counter perceived threats to Christian culture. After failing in the early twentieth century to stop the spread of modernism in many denominations, traditionalists left them to start their own more independent churches and schools. They also took to the airwaves, coming to dominate Christian radio and television. They became very engaged in the crusade against communism, and many of them also crusaded against civil rights legislation, which they saw as communist-inspired. In the 1960s and 70s, they reacted against the sexual revolution and the feminist movement, which they perceived as destroying the traditional Christian family. As the government increasingly declined to enforce Christian standards of behavior–by legalizing abortion, allowing pornography, and prohibiting prayer in public schools–hostility toward government grew.

Republican political operatives then saw an opportunity to recruit religious conservatives to their party. One of those operatives, Richard Viguerie, maintains that the issue that most helped him do so was the racial desegregation of private schools. Most of the private Christian schools had been created after the Supreme Court’s school desegregation decision, and in the 1970s, the IRS began denying tax exemptions to schools that still discriminated. Christian conservatives interpreted this as an assault on religious liberty.

Catholics had stronger ties to the Democratic Party than Protestants, since they were historically more urban and working-class, but they too had turned majority Republican by 1980. They shared certain moral concerns with Protestant conservatives, especially abortion, but they also responded to a second, somewhat less religious movement toward the right, which was neoconservatism.

Neoconservatism

The term “neoconservatism” is probably most associated today with the architects of the Iraq invasion within the George W. Bush administration, but it is a much broader and older movement. Horwitz distinguishes between two generations of neoconservatives. The first includes people like Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, Sidney Hook, Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. They had generally been supporters of liberal social reforms, but by the late 1960s they were becoming more pessimistic about government efforts like the War on Poverty. They began to emphasize the limits that the prevailing culture places on government. Moynihan, for example, argued that the matriarchal structure of the poor black family (strong mother, weak husband) was an obstacle to black advancement. [When he first made that argument he still believed that government income support could strengthen the black family, but he turned against such programs when he discovered that the support could enable some poor women to leave their husbands! Liberals wanted to keep the focus on fighting poverty, not promoting patriarchy.]

Part of the neoconservative critique of government social programs was the idea of the “New Class.” Max Schachtman had criticized the new class of self-serving bureaucrats that he believed had corrupted socialism in the Soviet Union. Neoconservatives now applied this pejorative term to the designers and implementers of federal social programs, who were allegedly doing more to create power and income for themselves than actually solve social problems. This fed the anti-establishment hostility toward the government “elite” who enrich themselves at the taxpayers’ expense, not to be confused with the hardworking business leaders who create real jobs and real economic value.

In foreign policy, neoconservatives reacted against the loss of the Vietnam War and the Democratic nomination of the peace candidate, George McGovern, in 1972. They called for strengthening the military to deal with the Soviet threat (later revealed to be greatly exaggerated), and considered the use of more aggressive tactics such as a nuclear first strike. When the Cold War ended with the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union, “the first generation of neoconservatives…drifted back to a more reserved foreign policy realism and began to advocate a more modest American presence in the world.”

However, a second generation of neoconservatives, including such figures as Richard Perle, William Kristol, Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz and Francis Fukuyama, responded to the end of the Cold War with a call for a more moralistic and idealistic foreign policy. America’s position as the sole remaining superpower was an opportunity to make the twenty-first century the “American Century,” bringing the benefits of American-style democracy to the rest of the world, by force if necessary.

In practical terms, this translated into calls for substantial increases in the military budget, support for missile defense systems, and a foreign policy dedicated to transformation, not coexistence; for “regime change,” not mere stability and containment; for an aggressive unipolar internationalism rather than a balance of power realism. The fall of the Soviet Union created the possibility of a unipolar peace, a Pax Americana. Because American interests were tied inextricably to universal liberal values, any transformation of bad political regimes was a blessing to the world as well as a benefit to the United States.

Both the religious right and neoconservatism expanded their control over the Republican Party from the 1970s to the 2000s, reaching their greatest influence to date in the presidency of George W. Bush. Views that had been anti-establishment became much more established. After the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center, Bush channeled popular anger into military actions he characterized as a war against an “axis of evil.” Horwitz points out this irony: early neoconservatives emphasized the limitations of government action to change our own society, but later neoconservatives made extravagant claims about the ability of our government to change other societies, such as Iraq. We couldn’t eliminate poverty at home, but a brief military intervention was all that was necessary for democracy to flower abroad. The results of the Iraq war were sobering in that respect.

Although neoconservatism is a much more secular movement than conservative Christianity, they do converge in certain respects:

More deeply, they share a utopian, dogmatic approach to the world: an insistence on the palpable, embodied existence of evil, a tendency to demonize Islam as an inherently violent religion, an unquestioning support of Israel, a hatred of liberals, an insistence on American exceptionalism, a conviction that American power can positively remake the Middle East, and an embrace of military force that reflects reverence for a particular version of masculinity and an impatience with ideas or positions that feel feminine. But these features are anathema to the give and take of democratic politics.

My final post on Horwitz’s book will describe the Tea Party in particular, and then discuss that last point. Anti-establishment conservatism is deeply rooted in our political and religious traditions. But how much power can it acquire before it becomes a danger to itself and to democracy?

Continued