America’s Right

October 23, 2013

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Robert B. Horwitz. America’s Right: Anti-Establishment Conservatism from Goldwater to the Tea Party. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2013.

The recent federal government shutdown and threat of default has focused the country’s attention on the Tea Party faction of the Republican Party. In an effort to force Congress and the President to defund or delay the Affordable Care Act, Tea Party Republicans refused to support a continuing resolution needed to fund discretionary spending, or an increase in borrowing authority needed to meet the government’s existing fiscal obligations. The result was a partial government shutdown and an imminent danger of the first federal default in US history. In the end, the tactic not only failed, but is generally seen as having damaged the Republican Party and the Tea Party itself. What remains clear, however, is that the Tea Party wields substantial power. Over 60% of Republicans in the Republican-controlled House of Representatives voted against the deal to reopen the government, although they themselves seemed unsure of what a continued shutdown would accomplish. Even those who criticized the Tea Party privately feared for their jobs if they didn’t vote with them publicly.

If many Americans are left scratching their heads and asking, “Where did these people come from?” Robert Horwitz’s new book provides a timely answer. “This is anti-establishment conservatism, whose origin can be traced back to the right wing that battled both the reigning post-World War II liberal consensus and the moderate, establishment Republican Party.” Anti-establishment conservatism has been around for a long time, but only recently has it become “the foremost face of the Republican Party, manifest in the populist rage of the Tea Party and the stunning obduracy of Republicans in Congress.” Much of Horwitz’s book is the story of how this happened.

The anti-establishment conservatives were the people who never went along with the “liberal consensus” that developed after World War II. By the 1950s, most people–including establishment Republicans like Dwight Eisenhower–had come to accept much of the expansion of government that had occurred during the Great Depression and World War II. The prevailing Keynesian economics provided a rationale for government spending to create economic opportunity, boost consumer demand and maintain full employment. With support from federal law and the National Labor Relations Board, labor unions seemed here to stay. The recovery from the Depression and the ensuing prosperity enabled Democrats to forge a broad coalition (including most white Southerners before the race issue made them reconsider their support in the 1960s). In foreign policy, the consensus supported an interventionist but moderate and realistic policy of trying to contain communism, but not trying to overthrow entrenched communist regimes in the Soviet Union and China.

Anti-establishment conservatism is deeply rooted in classical American liberalism, which stresses individual liberty and property rights and fears the strong state.

For conservatives the experience of the twentieth century was that in the name of equality and with the professed aim of improving life for the masses, the state alarmingly accrued power and weakened property rights. In so doing, the state undermined the fundamental condition of liberty that emanates from property, undercutting freedom writ large. The old right thus called for the “rollback” of the New Deal. Its critique of the state in many respects extended to foreign policy. In the period between the two world wars, American conservatives tended toward isolationism. They counseled avoidance of entangling political commitments – especially in European affairs, which, after the experience of World War I, conservatives saw as intractable. And because spending on armies and armaments required higher taxes and thus inevitably produced inflation, the old right was convinced that a militarized foreign policy would lead inevitably to the dreaded concentration of governmental power.

As public opinion increasingly favored government intervention to improve the economy at home and defend democracy abroad, this “old right” fractured, with most Republicans becoming moderate supporters of strong government. But anti-establishment conservatism rejected both the postwar liberal consensus and the Republican establishment that made its peace with it. “Located principally in small business and its political affiliates, geographically rooted in the Midwest and West, but also scattered amongst a welter of anti-communist and political fringe groups (some of which identified as Christian religious organizations standing up for God and western civilization), anti-establishment conservatism continued the call for the rollback of the New Deal….”

Importantly, however, anti-establishment conservatism did not call for a return to isolationism. On the contrary, it became more aggressively anti-communist than the establishment, calling not just for the containment of communism but its defeat. As Horwitz sees it, this position results from the fusion of two strains in conservative thinking: libertarianism and moral traditionalism. Because American society was founded on individual liberty, strong believers in individual freedom from the state can defend it as a moral and even religious principle. The all-powerful state is a moral and religious abomination, since it undermines God-given liberty and individual moral responsibility. The struggle against both godless communism and New Deal liberalism takes on the character of a religious crusade.

Horwitz uses the term “anti-statist statism” to call attention to a great irony in conservative thinking. Although these conservatives feared the strong state, they supported the expansion of the military establishment and defense industries in order to strengthen the American state in its battle with foreign enemies. Many new conservatives in places like Orange County, California relied on defense spending for their incomes while criticizing high federal taxes as an infringement on personal property rights.

Barry Goldwater emerged as a the leader of anti-establishment conservatism in the 1960s. He succeeded in winning the Republican nomination for President, but lost badly to Lyndon Johnson. Goldwater’s “states rights” position on civil rights did fracture the Democratic coalition enough for him to win five Southern states. After 1964, his party returned to more moderate leaders such as Richard Nixon, but “the forces set in motion by his defeat laid the ideological and institutional groundwork for anti-establishment conservatism’s subsequent ascendance….It regrouped, built institutions and recruited leaders, attracted money from right-wing businessmen, mobilized conservative Christians politically, and sixteen years later, helped bring Ronald Reagan to the presidency.”

Helping this process along were a series of developments that called liberal policies into question. Keynesian economics didn’t seem to have a solution to the runaway inflation of the 1970s. The government spending that had successfully boosted employment and consumer demand could now be blamed for feeding inflation. Federal efforts at racial integration provoked resistance not only from Southern segregationists, but from other whites who feared that advances for minorities would come at their expense. Cultural revolutions affecting such areas of behavior as sexuality and gender roles generated a backlash from moral traditionalists. Foreign policy failures such as the loss of the Vietnam War and the Iranian hostage-taking aroused fears of national weakness.

Two conservative movements in particular–the new Christian right and neoconservatism–strengthened anti-establishment conservatism and prepared the way for its new dominance within the Republican party. They will be the subject of my next post.

Continued


Higher Education in America (part 3)

October 11, 2013

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The second of Derek Bok’s “urgent priorities” for higher education–besides increasing the number of students earning college degrees–is improving the quality of instruction. While most of the highest-ranking universities in the world are in the United States, that in itself does not establish the quality of American undergraduate education. “The impressive global rankings of American universities reflect the accomplishments of only a handful of institutions, and even the high regard in which the latter are held is largely due to the excellence of their research rather than the quality of education they provide.” Bok fears that an increase in the number of degrees granted could come at the expense of quality. “Efforts to increase the percentage of young Americans with college degrees (and lower the costs of educating them) are attracting far more high-level attention than attempts to maintain and increase the amount they learn along the way.”

The diversity of institutions described earlier makes it hard to achieve a generally high standard of quality. For-profit colleges have come in for special criticism. They specialize in providing job preparation for students of modest means who rely heavily on federal grants and loans to pay the tuition. Critics charge that they recruit students too aggressively by overselling what they offer, then leave too many students underprepared and overindebted. “Six years after entering a for-profit institution, students are more likely to be unemployed and out of school than students of similar qualifications who entered not-for-profit institutions.”

Results for community colleges have also been somewhat disappointing. Although two-thirds of their students start out with the intention of transferring to a four-year college, no more than one-fourth actually do so. “The most careful study to date suggests that even six years after entry, only 36 percent of students entering community colleges have either earned an associate’s (two-year) degree or gone on to graduate from a four-year college.”

As economic inequality continues to worsen, “America could easily end up with a two-tier structure of undergraduate education: an expensive, quality tier primarily for those who can afford it, and a low-cost, heavily vocational education of marginal quality for all the rest.”

However, Bok sees lots of room for qualitative improvement in the comprehensive four-year colleges as well. He believes that a movement is already underway to implement new methods of instruction based on a growing body of research about what works. In particular, he welcomes a movement away from lecturing, “a method repeatedly shown to be one of the least effective means of developing higher-level thinking skills or helping students to achieve a deep comprehension of challenging subject matter.” Instead, professors should “spend much of the time in class having students grapple with problems raised by their readings.”

Bok also sees great pedagogical potential in online education. Students can interact online with their instructor and one another, access source materials more easily, conduct experiments and participate in simulations. Instructors can monitor online discussion groups and assignments and adjust their teaching accordingly. Much of this potential remains to be realized however. As it stands now, only the most highly motivated students complete online courses very often; teachers haven’t resolved how to prevent cheating and give reliable grades; and a portion of the population still lacks broadband access. Effective design of online courses is also a big challenge. Bok quotes Lawrence Bacow: “To date, no sustainable platform exists that allows interested faculty either to create a fully interactive, machine-guided learning environment or to customize a course that has been created by someone else….”

Another concern is what students are actually studying, considering the range of goals that higher education is supposed to achieve:

For almost a century, undergraduate education in the United States has pursued three large, overlapping objectives. The first goal is to equip students for a career either by imparting useful knowledge and skills in a vocational major or by developing general qualities of mind through a broad liberal arts education that will stand students in good stead in almost any calling. The second aim, with roots extending back to ancient Athens, is to prepare students to be enlightened citizens of a self-governing democracy and active members of their own communities. The third and final objective is to help students live a full and satisfying life by cultivating a wide range of interests and a capacity for reflection and self-knowledge.

Bok clearly regards the liberally educated person as both a better citizen and a better worker. He cites research demonstrating the value that companies and business leaders place on general abilities like “thinking critically, communicating effectively both orally and in writing, acquiring a sensitivity and concern for ethical issues, and learning to understand and work effectively with people of different cultures, backgrounds, and races.” He is concerned about the amount of coursework undergraduates complete in vocational specializations, citing research indicating that science and engineering majors show declining proficiency on many of these abilities over the course of their education.

Bok then questions whether traditional college course requirements are serving the objectives of higher education very well–so many credits in a major, so many credits of electives, “leaving only the limited time left over to achieve all the other purposes the faculty chooses to adopt.” That time left over is often spent meeting a “general education” requirement by taking a smattering of survey courses in various departments. The system works for the faculty, since each academic department in guaranteed a certain audience for its courses, but maybe not as well for the students. “It is possible that some of the requirements agreed to by the faculty are uneasy compromises that threaten to produce the worst of both worlds–making enough demands on students’ time to represent a burden but not enough to afford much chance of actually achieving the hoped-for results.”

Having recently reviewed Robert Samuels’ critique of higher education, I find it interesting to compare his perspective to Bok’s. They agree on a number of things: that universities often spend too much money on things that are marginal to educational quality, that the things that really matter are often less visible and harder to measure, that the time students are required to devote to their studies has been dropping, that an emphasis on research sometimes detracts from undergraduate instruction, and that instruction relies too heavily on the lecture method.

Samuels goes on to make a much stronger charge, that undergraduates are being fundamentally shortchanged, since tuition is going up but the portion of revenue spent on undergraduate instruction is going down. Samuels seems more concerned than Bok that the percentage of undergraduate classes taught by traditional tenure-track faculty has fallen to about one-third, and that many of the part-time and adjunct instructors who have replaced them are less qualified in academic degrees and experience. Bok is more ambivalent about this trend, saying on the one hand that “the use of part-time instructors…has also been found by some analysts to contribute to grade inflation, higher dropout rates, and other adverse effects on quality,” but on the other hand that “student course evaluations find that part-time and adjunct professors are usually rated at least as highly as the regular tenure-track faculty.”

If we place a high value on both Ph.D. programs and years of postdoctoral study and teaching experience, don’t we also have to worry about turning more classes over to less credentialed and experienced teachers, whether the students can tell the difference or not? I believe in course evaluations, and I believe that students can tell if teachers are organized, clear in their presentations, and fair in their testing, among other things. But the depths of a professor’s knowledge is much less obvious to them. I received surprisingly good evaluations as a young teacher called upon to teach subjects I knew very little about. I taught from a much more substantial knowledge base in my later years, but I’m not sure that my students knew enough to tell the difference.

Another issue where Samuels is more critical than Bok is class size. The non-lecture methods recommended by both writers require professors to give much more attention to the students’ individual thought processes, by engaging students in class and evaluating their oral and written arguments instead of just grading standardized tests. But only Samuels explicitly calls for smaller classes to facilitate such engagement.

Of course, highly qualified professors teaching small classes cost money. Both authors would like to reduce the costs for students, but Samuels is more willing to call for increased spending on undergraduate education to help bring this about. In a way it is easier for him to do so, since he believes that undergraduates are currently being overcharged in order to subsidize research and graduate education. One result is the production of more Ph.D.’s than can find the jobs they’ve been trained for, since the same universities that train them prefer to hire cheaper labor instead. So while Bok would improve the quality of instruction primarily through pedagogical and curricular reforms, Samuels would accomplish it more through a fairer redistribution of educational resources.


Higher Education in America (part 2)

October 10, 2013

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Derek Bok describes three key features of America’s higher education system. First, it is very diverse, including about 200 research universities, over 700 comprehensive universities, almost 1,000 private nonprofit colleges, over 1,000 community colleges, and over 1,300 for-profit institutions.

Second, it involves government only to a limited degree: “Because our higher education system has a large private sector along with a federal system in which much funding and oversight of universities is provided by the states, it is harder to create a coherent and effective national policy for higher education than is the case in most other countries.” Although total spending on higher education is 2.4% of national income, about twice as much as the average European country, a greater share of the costs fall on households since public support is more limited. (Although I don’t recall Bok making the connection, this sounds a lot like the US health care system–most expensive in the world but falling a little behind in results.)

The third key feature is competitiveness. Educational institutions are in serious competition for revenue and students, especially students with academic ability and financial means. Bok identifies this as “the aspect of our system that seems to produce the most mixed results.” On the one hand, it is “the source of much of the energy and innovation that characterize our universities at their best.” On the other hand, Bok is concerned that institutions compete in ways that waste resources or undermine quality. The things that are educationally most important aren’t the most visible to the public, especially to young students. People may be more impressed by attractive buildings or winning football teams than by the quality of instruction. That quality is challenging to measure, and national rankings are based on more readily available indicators like average SAT scores. “The result is that much of what is most important to the work of colleges and universities may be neglected, undervalued, or laid aside in the pursuit of more visible goals.” Bok is especially critical of universities that let their undergraduate teaching mission be overshadowed by efforts to “climb to a higher rung on the ladder of prestige” by becoming more like the major research universities.

A metropolitan university that excels in teaching students is likely to add more value than it would by becoming another medium-quality research institution. Even so, because the contributions from first-rate teaching are hard to evaluate and seldom win public acclaim or achieve much prestige, they tend to be overshadowed by more tangible, measurable, gains, such as higher SAT scores, new programs, and successful fund drives.

One way that students might like universities to compete would be reducing prices, like successful computer manufacturers. But that’s hard for suppliers of highly skilled services:

Most entities like colleges and universities that make extensive use of highly skilled labor raise their prices faster than the cost of living. The reason is that it is difficult to substitute machines for employees and achieve the productivity increases common to manufacturing, agriculture, and other sectors of the economy….Competition in most industries tends to lower prices. In higher education, however, what appeals to talented students, foundation officers, philanthropists, and other valued audiences is often not lower prices but higher quality, or what is commonly thought to be higher quality [emphasis added].

Another reason for higher tuition is the declining share of public university revenue coming from state governments. That share went from 32% in 1980 to 18% in 2009. In about the last 30 years, the consumer price index has risen 106%, but college tuition and fees have risen 439%, even more than the 251% increase in health-care costs. Bok objects to the “blanket charge that colleges cost too much,” because tuitions vary so much among institutions and financial aid is so widely available. Nevertheless, he notes that money is the most common reason undergraduates give for dropping out, and he is concerned that cost is a major obstacle to increasing college attendance and graduation rates. “Most of the additional enrollments needed to raise attainment levels will have to come from low- and moderate-income families, since children from more affluent homes already graduate in high enough numbers to leave little room for further growth.” But these families have been hurt not only by the increasing costs of college, but by the stagnation in wages for most workers, the increasing concentration of wealth and income at the top, the shift in financial aid from predominantly grants to predominantly loans, and the increasing emphasis on merit rather than need in the awarding of scholarships. (Although rewarding merit is a good thing in many contexts, the result can be that universities compete to make the best offer to students who would have gone to college anyway, whether they got financial aid or not.)

Bok is skeptical about addressing the problem with increases in federal financial aid. He doesn’t think it’s likely in a period of public austerity, and he fears that it will just enable state governments to make further cuts in their support. He suggests a different approach to federal aid:

The federal government should try to make more effective use of its resources by offering additional aid in the form of matching grants to the states instead of simply increasing Pell Grants. In order to qualify for additional aid, states should have to match the added funds with need-based grants (rather than merit awards or athletic scholarships) and agree to keep public tuitions from rising faster than increases in need-based aid.

Bok also recommends two things for universities and colleges to concentrate on:

…On the one hand, lowering dropout rates by offering simpler, more highly structured programs and by providing more effective remedial education and better counseling and job placement services; and, on the other hand, reducing costs by eliminating nonessential activities (such as intercollegiate athletics), making greater use of online courses and part-time instructors, and instituting more effective ways of keeping students from taking more courses than they need in order to graduate.

Although Bok tries to be cautiously optimistic, he doesn’t underestimate the difficulty of achieving reform on the scale needed to raise the educational achievement of students of limited means. He acknowledges that many of the recommended ways of cutting costs will encounter stiff resistance (cutting back sports), endanger quality (part-time instructors) or have as yet unknown results (more online courses).

Bok suggests five possible directions higher education may go, the first two of which are unpleasant to contemplate:

The first is that students will eventually balk at paying higher tuitions and taking on increasing debt and either gravitate to lower-cost colleges or abandon plans for college altogether….

A second possible outcome is that federal officials will try to restrain the rising cost of college by withholding their financial aid from universities that do not moderate their tuition increases….The most probable result will be a decline in educational effectiveness.

Three more favorable directions involve possible changes to the economy, a new approach to government financing, or technological change:

The third alternative is for the economy to resume the pattern that existed from 1950 to the mid-1970s when the gross domestic product (GDP) grew at a healthy rate and the gains were quite evenly distributed throughout the working population….[But Bok acknowledges a catch-22: Evenly distributed income gains will be hard to achieve without a more educated workforce.]

The fourth possibility is that, one way or another, government and college officials will arrive at an arrangement whereby federal and state governments agree to finance at least a slow growth in the undergraduate population through increased institutional support and student aid in return for reasonable restraint in the growth of tuitions….

The fifth and final possibility is that online education and related technological advances will produce enough cost savings to remove the need for unsustainable tuition increases while greatly reducing the expense of educating the larger cohorts of students required to raise current levels of educational attainment.

Continued


Higher Education in America

October 9, 2013

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Derek Bok. Higher Education in America. Princeton University Press, 2013.

In his introduction to this comprehensive analysis of higher education, former Harvard President Derek Bok quotes the National Governors Association: “The driving force behind the 21st century economy is knowledge, and developing human capital is the best way to ensure prosperity.”

Although some rapidly growing forms of work, such as food service, do not require much education, the good jobs increasingly do. The earnings gap between more and less educated workers has been widening. “By 2010, the median annual income for adults holding college degrees reached $54,000 compared with $32,600 for those with only a high school diploma.” Countries and regions with more educated workforces will be attracting more of the good jobs and generating more wealth. Beyond the occupational and economic rewards, college education is associated with many other benefits, such as healthier lifestyles, civic engagement, lower crime rates and greater racial tolerance.

How has the United States been doing in providing higher education to its citizens? Bok describes a transition from elite to mass higher education. The percentage of high school graduates entering some type of college has risen dramatically, “from 17 percent in 1950 to 39 percent in 1980, 55 percent in 2000, and 68 percent in 2011.” However, progress in graduation rates has been much slower and more uneven, and the proportion of adults holding at least a bachelor’s degree has been increasing more slowly in the United States than in many other countries. According to the Century Foundation, it’s now about one-third for Americans 25 to 29. The United States ranks ninth among nations in the proportion of young adults enrolled in college, but only sixteenth in degree attainment. This is disappointing, since for much of the twentieth century, this country was the undisputed world leader in college completion.

Just yesterday, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development released its international Survey of Adult Skills, which compared adults 16 to 65 in nineteen countries on literacy and numeracy. Adults in sixteen of the countries were also tested on “problem-solving in technology-rich environments,” using digital devices to locate and use information. Adults in the United States ranked near the middle in literacy and near the bottom in numeracy and technical problem-solving. The countries with the highest scores were Japan, Finland, Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. Particularly disturbing was the evidence of generational decline. Americans 55-65 scored above the international average; those 45-54 were about average, but those 16-45 were below average. Much of the decline may be due to the failures of elementary and secondary education; Americans without college educations compared even less favorably to their international peers than more educated Americans compared to theirs. Nevertheless, the overall results are pretty mediocre for a country that sends so many of its citizens to college.

Bok discusses a wide range of issues in higher education, including graduate and professional education as well as undergraduate. In the end, he concludes that two problems are the most urgent: raising the percentage of young people who complete college degrees, and improving the quality of education they receive. What will be hard is doing both at once. To some extent, improving quality means raising standards, but that could mean making it harder for some students to complete their course of study. Or looking at it the other way, raising graduation rates could mean admitting more academically marginal students and demanding less of them, thus lowering quality. So Bok is most interested in reforms that have the potential to help achieve either goal without sacrificing the other.

Continued


Why Congress Must Raise the Debt Ceiling

October 4, 2013

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I saw on the news the other day that 38% of Americans think that refusing to raise the debt ceiling is a good idea. Fortunately they are somewhat outnumbered by those who think it’s a bad idea. But 38% is a pretty large minority opposing a routine fiscal measure that most economists see as essential. I suspect that the 38% consist mostly of people who don’t understand the relationship of the debt ceiling to the fiscal workings of our government.

Here’s a quick quiz consisting of one multiple-choice question: Raising the debt ceiling is essentially the same as (a) increasing spending, (b) increasing the federal deficit, (c) funding Obamacare, (d) all of the above, (e) none of the above.

Let’s consider each alternative. Answer (a) is wrong because what forces the government to borrow is a budget deficit, and the government still has a deficit even when spending is falling, as it has been as a result of the sequester. But answer (b) is wrong too, because the annual deficit doesn’t have to be increasing in order for the total amount of debt to rise. Any deficit, even a shrinking one as we’ve had recently, adds to the national debt. The only way to hold debt constant is to run no deficit at all, and neither party has proposed a budget that comes close to achieving that immediately. Most economists wouldn’t like it if they did, since the massive tax increases or spending cuts required would be bad for the economic recovery.

Answer (c) is the most irrelevant of the bunch. The Affordable Care Act is to be funded through cost savings and tax increases, especially on the wealthy. It isn’t contributing to the current deficit, and so it has nothing to do with raising the debt ceiling. The correct answer is (e) none of the above.

Raising the debt ceiling from time to time is simply a logical consequence of running budget deficits. Since the budgets proposed by both parties include deficits, raising the debt ceiling should be a no-brainer. It’s simply permission for the Treasury to borrow the amounts needed to fulfill the legislative commitments that Congress itself has already made. The implications of not doing so are huge. The United States has never defaulted on a fiscal obligation. Through all of our budget problems and battles, the United States Treasury has remained the global model of a sound financial operation. The Treasury bond is the world’s safe haven in good times and bad, and the short-term Treasury bill is described in financial textbooks as the closest thing on earth to a risk-free investment.

Why in the world would either party want to put the “full faith and credit” of the United States of America at risk? I can think of only two reasons. The first is to score points with a public that mistakenly associates raising the debt ceiling with (a), (b), or (c) above: raising spending, increasing the deficit, or funding Obamacare. One party can make a big show of fiscal responsibility by refusing to raise the debt ceiling, instead of making the tough and often unpopular choices about taxes and spending that responsible budgeting requires. The second reason is even less responsible: to threaten damaging the nation in order to have one’s way in budget disputes.

Imagine a married couple arguing over money issues, so one spouse threatens not to make the mortgage payment unless the other gives in. That’s pretty irrational, since the household’s failure to meet its obligations will damage its credit rating, put its home at risk and hurt both partners. Now some people might regard the threat itself as a useful tactic to achieve a legitimate objective, like trying to rein in a partner’s excess spending. But even if making threats one doesn’t really intend to carry out is a good bargaining tactic–I personally don’t think it is–this argument assumes that the party making the threat is clearly in the right. In the case of federal fiscal policy, this is far from clear. One thing that makes the situation there very different is the power to tax, which complicates the fiscal options.

In the recent debates over the deficit, the Democrats have generally advocated a combination of spending cuts and tax increases, while the Republicans have generally advocated a combination of deeper spending cuts and tax reductions, as in the Ryan budget plan. Without getting into all of the economic arguments for one or the other, we can at least say that the Democratic approach is not obviously less reasonable than the Republican. In theory, Democrats have just as much right to threaten default if they don’t get their way on taxes, as Republicans have if they don’t get their way on spending. Why should either party be able to win by threatening to make the Treasury default on its obligations? Why is it only Republicans who try to get away with this? I don’t think it’s because their position is so obviously right; I think it’s because they are so righteous! Many Republicans have become so convinced that they are saving the country from socialism that they believe that they must win by any means necessary (although hopefully not including violent means). We know from history that people on the Left are fully capable of taking similar positions. But right now the bullies seem to be mostly on the Right, for historical reasons that are best left to some future post.

As of this writing, the Republicans appear to be ready to attach partisan conditions to any resolution to raise the debt ceiling. As with the government shutdown, President Obama will have to choose between caving in to irresponsible tactics, or standing firm and being accused of not negotiating. No matter who wins, the democratic process seems to be losing, and maybe the economic strength of the nation as well.