Political Bubbles (part 2)

November 13, 2014

Previous | Next

Having described how political ideologies, interests and institutions help inflate dangerous financial bubbles, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal turn their attention to what happens after a bubble bursts.

In the case of the bubble that burst in 2008, the political response was hampered for many reasons. Although the voters elected a moderate Democrat as President, the ideological positions within Congress changed very little. In fact, while the new Democrats elected in 2008 were mostly moderate candidates running in swing states, the new Republicans elected in 2010 were more often extreme conservatives from “red” states. After 2010, free market conservatism was even better represented in Congress than it had been before the crisis.

Although some large financial institutions failed, mergers and acquisitions–many of them arranged by government–created even larger ones that were truly “too big to fail,” giving them a kind of license to engage in risky behavior. The power of the financial industry to influence elections and shape legislation remained unchecked.

The institutional arrangements that make change difficult, such as the Senate filibuster, remained in place, and the number of bills that couldn’t be brought to a vote reached record proportions. By undoing some of the previous campaign finance reforms, the Supreme Court enhanced the political influence of powerful financial interests.

Responses to “pops” in American History

The difficulty of financial reform after the bubble popped in 2008 is fairly consistent with the historical experience. The authors draw four lessons from government responses in similar situations:

  1. Legislative responses to financial crises and economic downturns have generally been limited and delayed.
  2. The response often awaits a transition in political power. This partisan delay reflects the idea that the cause of the crisis is generally rooted in the ideology of the incumbent party.
  3. Future change in political power often reverses the initial legislative response. The reversal contributes to the next crisis. This point is central to the inevitability of future financial crises.
  4. Short-term reelection concerns undermine the search for longer-term solutions.

In the case of the most famous financial crisis, the crash of 1929, the legislative response was delayed until the election of 1932. By then, the economic damage was severe enough to generate a massive shift in ideology and voting, which gave Roosevelt large majorities of pro-intervention Democrats in both houses of Congress. In addition, the Republican Party included more moderates in those days, as a result of a progressive reaction against Gilded Age inequalities that had been building for some time. As a result, “FDR was able to do business with practical, compromising politicians. In contrast…Obama is faced with a pack of ideologues.”

As an example of the difference, the Roosevelt administration was able to provide debt relief to millions of farms and homeowners, with massive approval from the general public. The Obama administration’s efforts to restructure failing mortgages were not only hampered by a lack of cooperation from lenders, but attacked as a subsidy for irresponsible borrowers, a reaction that launched the Tea Party movement.

Legislative responses

Because of Congressional polarization and strong conservative opposition, the Obama administration’s major pieces of legislation–the economic stimulus package, the Dodd-Frank financial reform, and the Affordable Care Act–had to be carefully crafted to achieve a majority in the House and a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. In all three cases, votes split along clear ideological and party lines, with only just enough votes to win. The bills couldn’t include anything unacceptable to their least enthusiastic supporters.

The authors regard Dodd-Frank as a very limited financial reform. It makes few hard-and-fast rules, instead leaving a great deal to the discretion of regulatory agencies, mostly the same agencies that have demonstrated low regulatory capacity and over-dependence on industry in the past. It didn’t bode well that the agencies missed most of their deadlines for issuing the new regulations required by the law. Dodd-Frank did little to eliminate the problem of “too big to fail,” or change the executive compensation practices that led to excessive risk taking, or regulate risky financial derivatives.

Another political response to the crisis, the Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) had a different political dynamic. It was proposed by the Bush administration as an emergency response to the banking crisis. The vote did not split neatly along liberal/conservative lines, since opposition came both from conservatives opposed to government intervention and some liberals opposed to government generosity toward big banks. It may have been necessary, but it wasn’t very popular at either end of the political spectrum.

Public opinion

The authors explore some of the nuances of political populism. In general, it “arises from mistrust of elites and the institutions they govern,” but it takes many forms. One populist current in American history is “distrust of big business, finance, and concentrated economic power.” Even stronger currents, however, are distrust of government and of cultural elites like intellectuals. Before the 1970s and the Watergate scandal, most people said they trusted their government to do the right thing most of the time, but in 2007 only about 20% still thought so.

When the financial crisis hit in 2008, the public generally supported government interventions such as more financial regulation and assistance to homeowners. Given the general mistrust of government, however, that support was hard to sustain in the face of limited and mixed results. Many people couldn’t see how the government was helping them, even as they heard about bailouts for big banks and low-income homeowners. In the face of relentless attack from the well-mobilized right, especially the Tea Party, public support for change withered. Meanwhile, the Occupy Wall Street movement was trying to mobilize opposition to financial elites and extreme inequality, but they suffered from an inability to agree on an agenda, disengagement with party politics, and hostility to any hierarchical organization.

I find it ironic that the economic failures of government–large deficits, wasteful wars, lax financial regulation–are clearly bipartisan accomplishments, and yet the resulting mistrust of government seems to benefit mostly Republicans as the most overtly anti-government party. Low expectations of government easily become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Recommendations

McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal would like to see the political response to financial crises strengthened in these ways:

  • “Use simple regulatory rules,” such as a simple “Volcker rule” that commercial banks cannot trade securities on their own account. Dodd-Frank let regulators write a several hundred page rule that is much harder to interpret and enforce.
  • “Set rules that account for political risk,” for example that are strong enough to be useful even if total compliance cannot be achieved
  • “Limit the activities of taxpayer-insured financial firms,” since federal deposit insurance gives taxpayers a stake in the financial outcomes
  • “Reform compensation practices,” so that financial executives cannot receive large bonuses for making bad bets with other people’s money
  • “Prevent ‘Too Big to Fail'” by actually limiting the size and power of financial institutions
  • “Increase regulatory and prosecutorial capacity,” making regulators less dependent on the knowledge and talent of the industry they regulate

In order for reforms like this to occur, the authors see the need for a major shift of ideology, such as occurred during the Progressive Era around the turn of the previous century. Although Americans are generally agreed that the country is on the wrong track, they seem unable to define a more constructive role for government in setting a new direction. I suspect that a new generation will have to be heard from before this will happen.


Political Bubbles

November 12, 2014

Previous | Next

Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal. Political Bubbles: Financial Crises and the Failure of American Democracy. 2013. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

This book is an indictment of the American political system, not for causing financial crises, but for making them worse through political action or inaction. In the authors’ view, financial bubbles have been accompanied by “political bubbles.”

Financial bubbles occur when the prices of financial assets rise far beyond their “fundamental” value, the value that could be justified by some rational economic analysis. They are driven by excessive optimism, or by the desire to encourage and profit from the optimism of others. In the case of the housing bubble, the overvalued assets were risky subprime mortgages and the complicated financial instruments that were based on them.

A political bubble is a “set of policy biases that foster and amplify the market behaviors that generate financial crises….Rather than tilting against risky behavior, the political bubble aids, abets, and amplifies it.” The authors identify three channels through which this political amplification of financial bubbles occurs: the three I’s of ideology, interests, and institutions.

 Ideology

The authors see an ideology as a belief system whose rigidity “inhibits the rational adaptation of policy to the circumstances of financial crisis.” Ideologues hold to their policy positions even when the results are unfortunate. The ideology of free-market conservatism is most conducive to financial bubbles, but other ideologies play a role. The egalitarian belief system more common on the political left supported efforts to broaden home ownership by making mortgage loans to lower-income buyers. This gave political cover to predatory lenders, who could claim to be promoting the public interest with tricky subprime and adjustable rate mortgages.

The authors use a spatial model of Congressional voting that places each issue and each legislator along a single dimension from liberal to conservative. The model is remarkably successful in predicting how most legislators will vote on most issues, accounting for over 90% of votes cast in the most recent Congresses. By calculating and comparing the average ideological scores of each major party over time, the authors conclude that ideological polarization is at an all-time high. This has occurred primarily because the Republican Party has moved more to the right. To put this in historical context, polarization has risen and fallen in tandem with economic inequality, the last peak having been reached in the Gilded Age. The authors see a reciprocal relationship between economic excess and political polarization:

In periods in which there are huge economic rewards to unfettered markets, support for free market conservatism increases–especially among those individuals and groups who benefit the most….Political polarization leads to political gridlock that makes economic reform difficult. Not only can the economic losers not form a coalition to redirect the allocation of resources, but the government cannot effectively respond to those economic shocks and crises which in turn further increases polarization.

I think that’s a pretty good summary of our political impasse.

Interests

Looking beyond legislators to those who influence them, individuals and organizations who are profiting the most from financial bubbles have strong motives to support policies that sustain those bubbles. As the financial services industry expanded and thrived in the bubble years, it also gained political power. “Campaign contributions from the financial sector increased almost threefold between 1992 and 2008, even after adjusting for inflation,” making it by far the largest source of contributions to political campaigns.

The book also cites the work of Larry Bartels, who demonstrated that actual legislative votes correspond most to the desires of high-income constituents, and hardly at all to those with low incomes.

Powerful financial interests influence politicians with information as well as money. Complex financial issues are often challenging for individual legislators to understand, and corporate lobbyists are only too happy to “help” them.

The interests of politicians easily come to overlap the interests of their most powerful constituents. Many have been rewarded for their pro-business policies with high-level positions in the very businesses those policies help.

Institutions

A variety of institutional arrangements make the American democratic system very sluggish in its response to financial crises. “The problem is that political power in the United States is so fragmented, separated, and checked that policy change requires extraordinary consensus and mobilization.”

For example, we elect our Congressional representatives with frequent elections conducted in rather small legislative districts. That can make representatives less responsive to national needs than to the demands of local constituents, especially the richest and best organized. In the Senate, permissive filibuster rules effectively require a 60-vote majority just to bring a bill to a vote.

Financial regulators suffer from a “low regulatory capacity.” They lack the resources and expertise to keep up with the growing and complexifying financial sector. Often they end up relying on the industry they regulate for information, talent and expertise, making them vulnerable to “capture” by that industry.

The political bubble in the recent financial crisis

In the period leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, ideology, interests and institutions combined to amplify rather than counter the growing financial bubble:

The lethal concoction that destroyed the investor society and the broader standard of living had five components— all rooted in our Three I’s. The first was deregulation that permitted innovative new financial instruments, such as exotic mortgage products, collateralized debt obligation tranches, and credit default swaps to emerge without meaningful regulation. The second was deregulation that permitted financial firms to engage in a riskier range of activities. The third was a reduction in the monitoring capacity of regulators, either through deliberate neglect, as reflected in the tenures of Alan Greenspan at the Federal Reserve and Harvey Pitt and Christopher Cox at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), or as a result of the failure of staffing and budgets to expand at the same rate as the markets they were supposed to regulate. The fourth was the shifts in competition policy that allowed the creation of financial institutions that were too big (and too politically powerful) to fail. The fifth component was the privatization of government financing of mortgages through Fannie and Freddie, which created two additional too-big-to-fail institutions.

Financial deregulation took place during a period of three decades, heavily driven by ideology and interests. In the early 1980s, federal law deregulated interest rates, overriding state usury laws and allowing adjustable rate mortgages. These “quickly got distorted into ‘teaser’ loans with low introductory interest rates that later reset to usurious levels.” Exorbitant interest rates made it increasingly profitable to lend money even to people with a high risk of being unable to repay the principal. Complex financial derivatives whose value depended on subprime loans were exempted from regulation in 2000. Once these deregulations had occurred, institutional limitations combined with ideology and interests to block reform. All of the numerous attempts in Congress to curb predatory lending failed.

A number of forces came together to support risky lending as a way of encouraging home ownership. Free market conservatism generally opposed financial regulation. In addition, Republican administrations were anxious to promote the “ownership society,” in which more people could build private wealth instead of relying on government. For most people, wages were stagnant, but they could build wealth anyway if they could obtain a mortgage loan and leverage a small down payment into some growing equity. Bill Clinton and other Democrats also promoted home loans to broaden the middle class and create a more egalitarian society. So an expansion of home loans had much more bipartisan support than direct housing subsidies to low-income households, which would cost the taxpayers money.

Implementing the federal role in expanding home ownership was largely the responsibility of two “Government-Sponsored Enterprises” (GSEs), the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac). Both entities helped finance home ownership by buying qualifying mortgages from lenders. “Lenders in turn used the proceeds of these sales to issue more mortgages, which lowered borrowing costs and stimulated housing demand. The subsidy embedded in Fannie and Freddie was enhanced by the ultimately correct perception that the government guaranteed their debt. This guarantee reduced their borrowing costs below those other corporate borrowers.” Congressional legislation under both Republican and Democratic administrations encouraged the GSEs to back more mortgages for lower-income households. Even if the mortgages they backed were fairly safe, the additional capital enabled private lenders to make shakier loans and sell them off to unsuspecting investors. The authors are certainly not endorsing the view that the financial crisis was all the government’s fault; they regard that as an ideological position appealing to those who think that free markets can do no wrong. They are only showing how political factors helped inflate the financial bubble.

In the end, this way of creating an “ownership society” was a colossal failure. Rates of home ownership peaked and then crashed, especially for the ethnic minorities who had the lowest rates to begin with. Free-market ideology, sprinkled with a few liberal good intentions and a lot of money in politics, amplified the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.

Continued


Who Votes Now? (part 2)

February 21, 2014

Previous | Next

Leighley and Nagler argue that voter turnout matters in the United States because of increasing income inequality and a persistent income bias in voting. Higher-income voters vote more, and political leaders are more responsive to their interests.

Perceived policy choices

The poor may vote less for many reasons, such as being too busy trying to make ends meet to think very much about politics. But one reason might be that they don’t perceive much difference between candidates on the issues that concern them, or that they don’t see either candidate’s position as very close to their own. Leighley and Nagler test these hypotheses by measuring two variables they call Perceived Policy Difference and Perceived Policy Alienation.

The data for this part of their study come from the American National Election Study covering elections from 1972 to 2008. They analyze the responses to two items:

  1. A seven-point political ideology scale from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative”
  2. A seven-point jobs question, with the endpoints “Some people feel that the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living” and “Others think that the government should just let each person get ahead on his/her own.”

Respondents were asked about the candidates’ positions as well as their own.

Perceived Policy Difference turned out to be a better predictor of voting than Perceived Policy Alienation. For both of the above items, voters who perceived a difference between candidates were more likely to vote. Each item had an independent effect, suggesting that the more differences voters perceive between candidates, the more likely they are to vote. Low-income respondents perceived less difference in candidates than high-income respondents, which is one reason they didn’t vote as much.

Differences between voters and nonvoters

For voter turnout to matter, voters must differ from nonvoters in their positions on issues. More specifically, the authors argue that the income bias in who votes matters because voters differ from nonvoters on economic issues. This is true, for example, for the jobs question: “In 2008, there is a 10.2 percentage-point difference between nonvoters and voters believing that it is the government’s responsibility to guarantee jobs, and a 12.5 percentage-point difference between voters and nonvoters believing that people should ‘get by on their own.'” Voters also differ from nonvoters in political affiliation. In 2008, Republicans were a much larger percentage of voters than of nonvoters (42.7% vs. 26.9%), while Democrats were a slightly smaller percentage (51.7% vs. 54.1%), and Independents were a much smaller percentage (5.6% vs. 18.9%). Independents are a rather disparate bunch, by the way, since the term includes many people who just aren’t interested in politics, as well as a few with specific positions outside the political mainstream.

The authors also report on the 2004 National Annenberg Election Study, which compared the percentages of voters and nonvoters favoring certain economic policies. For each of the following policies, voters were less in favor than nonvoters:

Government health insurance for workers (68.1% vs. 82.1%)
Government health insurance for children (76.6% vs. 88.1%
Making union organizing easier (53.5% vs. 65.9%)
More federal assistance for schools (66.9% vs. 78.6%)
Increasing the minimum wage (80.5% vs. 88.3%)

Leighley and Nagler summarize their findings:

Voters are significantly more conservative than nonvoters on redistributive issues, and they have been in every election since 1972. If we had to point to our most important empirical finding of the many that we report, this is it. Voters may be more liberal than nonvoters on social issues, but on redistributive issues they are not. These redistributive issues define a fundamental relationship between citizens and the state in a modern industrialized democracy and are central to ongoing conflicts about the scope of government. It is on these issues that voters offer a biased view of the preferences of the electorate.

International studies find that the United States stands out among democracies both for its low voter turnout and the income bias in its turnout. The authors charge that our political parties are “failing to convince lower-income voters that they are offering distinctive choices on these issues. Whether perception or reality, this perceived lack of choices undermines the extent to which elections function as a linkage mechanism between citizen preferences and government policies.” Although legislative changes to make voting easier do increase general turnout a little, the authors do not find that they boost turnout very much for the lowest income quintile. What would help more, the authors believe, is giving low-income voters something more substantial to vote for.

Clearly the focus of this study on income bias in voting reflects the authors’ values. They are obviously concerned about the impact of economic inequality on democracy. Critics may fault them for looking so hard for evidence to support their theory. On the other hand, by focusing on this issue, Leighley and Nagler are able to correct some conventional wisdom in their field that turnout doesn’t matter very much. Studies that include a large smorgasbord of issues may find that it often doesn’t. But who participates in the democratic act of voting may matter a great deal in deciding how our democracy addresses a specific issue of great importance–the response of democratic government to the economic inequalities generated by the market economy. (For an interesting discussion of this very old problem, see Benjamin Radcliff’s The Political Economy of Human Happiness.) The question of who votes is inseparable from the question of whose economic interests does government serve. Does it protect the winnings of the more successful or create more opportunity for the less successful? Bill de Blasio ran away with the New York mayor’s race by attacking economic inequality specifically. Is that an antidote for voter disengagement, and a portent of things to come?


Who Votes Now?

February 20, 2014

Previous | Next

Jan E. Leighley and Jonathan Nagler. Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014

In 1980, Ray Wolfinger and Steve Rosenstone published Who Votes?, a classic text on voter turnout in the United States. They found that although turnout in presidential elections is low–often less than 60% of eligible voters–that doesn’t effect election outcomes as much as one might think. They didn’t find that voters and nonvoters were different enough in political preferences to make turnout a very large factor. Adding in the nonvoters would not change the outcomes of most elections.

Leighley and Nagler believe that new research is warranted, especially in light of increasing income inequality and the persistent income bias in voter turnout. “The share of income going to the bottom fifth of the distribution decreased from 4.1 percent in 1972 to 3.4 percent of income by 2008. During that same time the share of income going to the wealthiest fifth of the population increased from 43.9 percent of income to 50% of income.” During this period voting rates varied from about 50% for the poorest quintile to 80% for the richest quintile.

Leighley and Nagler set out to show that voters are not representative of the general population when it comes to certain policy issues, especially issues of taxing and spending that affect the distribution of wealth. Nonvoters are more likely to be low-income people who would support redistributive policies if they had an opportunity to do so. The qualification is important, since the authors believe that “the impact of increased economic inequality on turnout will be conditioned by the nature of the political choices offered by the political parties. Individuals may not be given the option by either party to substantially redistribute income from those above the median income level to those below it.” If not, they may have little incentive to vote. And since politicians are more responsive to those who vote than those who don’t, the income bias in voting perpetuates an income bias in policy. By this logic, low turnout is much more detrimental to democracy than earlier studies acknowledged.

Demographics of voting

In addition to the persistent income bias in voting, Leighley and Nagler report a large educational effect–individuals with more formal education are more likely to vote. Multivariate analysis shows that income and education each have an independent effect on voting.

The Anglo (non-Hispanic white) portion of the population declined from 83.2% to 65.6% over the election period studied, 1972-2008. Hispanics are less likely to vote, however, even after controlling for ethnic differences in income and education. African Americans are also less likely to vote, but that difference disappears after controlling for income and education. Blacks actually vote at higher rates than whites of similar socioeconomic status, and black turnout was already increasing before Barack Obama ran for president.

The old vote more than the young, with a noticeable recent increase among those over 75. While age gaps persist, voting rates for the young have been gaining on those of the middle-aged. Single people vote less than married people, even after controlling for age, but the single portion of the population has been growing as people marry later and experience more divorce.

Women used to vote less than men, but since 1984 they’ve been voting more than men.

The authors do not discuss in any detail how these changing demographics affect political party affiliation or voting preferences. The turnout of higher-income voters is no doubt crucial to Republican candidates, but Democrats might take comfort in the fact that some groups with Democratic inclinations are either growing as a share of the population (Hispanics, single people) or voting at a higher rate (women, African Americans).

Legal measures to increase turnout

The authors observe that “the United States is unique among modern democracies in the burden it puts on citizens seeking to exercise their right to vote.” Voter registration usually requires a special application process well in advance of an election. Voting often takes place within a short window of time scheduled for a workday. One approach to increasing turnout is making it easier to register or cast a ballot.

Between 1972 and 2008, most states adopted one or more innovations to make voting easier. The number of states allowing voter registration through motor vehicle departments increased from 2 to 50, as required by a new federal law; the number with “no-fault” absentee voting (voting absentee for whatever reason), went from 2 to 27; the number with in-person early voting went from 2 to 27; and the number with election-day registration went from 0 to 9.

Leighley and Nagler find small but significant effects for many of these reforms. Their quantitative model estimates that no-fault absentee voting increases turnout by 3.2%, and election-day voting increases it by 2.8%. Early voting has little effect unless the voting period is unusually long. The authors did not study the effects of rolling back any of these reforms, as Republicans in some states are now trying to do. One wonders if increases in turnout are easily reversible, or if most of the newer voters continue to participate once they get over the initial hurdle. Also not studied were new legal requirements such as voter ID.

Having reported the modest effects of legislative changes on turnout, the authors turn to their main interest, demonstrating that the income bias in turnout leaves certain economic policy positions underrepresented in our democracy. That will be the topic of my next post.


Curbing the Filibuster

November 22, 2013

Previous | Next

Yesterday a majority consisting only of Democrats changed the rules of the Senate to eliminate the filibuster for presidential appointments to the executive branch and the judiciary. A simple majority will now be enough to bring such appointments to a vote, instead of the “supermajority” of 60 needed to end a filibuster.

Democrats hailed this as a victory for majority rule, while Republicans condemned it as a power grab trampling on minority rights. Mainstream media like the Washington Post and NPR made it sound bad for everybody by describing it as an “escalation of partisan warfare.” The CBS Evening News called it a “new low,” as the Democrats “swept away 200 years of tradition.”

Well, not exactly. The filibuster as it has existed for the last few decades–and especially for the first five years of the Obama Administration–is hardly a longstanding historical tradition. The Senate has revised its rules repeatedly as it has struggled to balance the right of a minority to be heard with the right of a majority to get something done. Now it has acted again because previous rule changes combined with extreme political polarization to let filibustering get out of control.

Webster’s dictionary defines the filibuster as “the use of extreme dilatory tactics in an attempt to delay or prevent action esp. in a legislative assembly.” The most common tactic associated with the term is the refusal to stop debating so that a proposal can come to a vote. Until 1917 the Senate had no formal way of ending debate; votes were taken after all those who wished to speak had had their say. That made filibusters possible, but they rarely occurred in practice. In 1917, the Senate adopted a cloture rule ending debate by a two-thirds majority, which remained the rule until 1975. (Two-thirds meant two-thirds of those voting, except during the period 1949-1959, when it was changed to two-thirds of the entire Senate.)

Two more important changes occurred in the 1970s. After filibusters of civil rights legislation got in the way of other Senate business, the Senate created a two-track system allowing other bills to be considered even while a filibustered bill was still pending. In 1975 the Senate made it easier to end debate by reducing the cloture requirement from two-thirds to three-fifths. However, it also removed the requirement that Senators actually have to keep speaking on the floor in order to filibuster. The result of these changes was that filibusters increased dramatically. When filibustering meant speaking continuously and impeding all other business, it was a tactic too extreme to be used lightly or very often. But once Senators could require a vote of 60 simply by announcing their intention to filibuster, the power of a minority of at least 41 to block legislation was greatly enhanced. The filibuster was transformed from a tactic for continuing debate into a tactic for blocking consideration of a measure altogether.

Political polarization made it hard for either party to get enough support from the other to get 60 votes. As Ezra Klein puts it, “Before the two parties became reasonably unified and disciplined ideological combatants, filibusters were rarely used as a tactic of inter-party warfare because each political party had both members who supported and opposed the bills in question. As that era waned, the filibuster became constant because parties could agree on what to oppose.”

Both parties now have a stronger temptation to filibuster when they are in the minority. The last time the Republicans controlled the Senate, the Democrats filibustered some of President Bush’s judicial appointments, and it was the Republicans who got them to stop by threatening to change the rules. During the Obama administration, the Republicans have far surpassed the Democrats in both the frequency and obstructionist nature of their filibusters. In the case of presidential appointments, they have gone beyond challenging candidates on their merits to trying to prevent vacant positions from being filled at all. Sometimes this is to prevent an agency they don’t like from functioning, such as the Consumer Financial Protection Agency or National Labor Relations Board. Sometimes it is to maintain the current balance of Republican and Democratic judges in the courts. The last straw for Democrats was when the Republican leadership declared its opposition to filling any of the three vacancies on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the court with jurisdiction over many cases involving federal agencies. That court can affect the fate of many federal regulations, such as environmental regulations and implementation of the Dodd-Frank financial reforms. Although the Constitution gives the President the responsibility to fill such vacancies and the Senate the responsibility to consider them, the Republicans decided unilaterally that no Obama nominees should be voted upon, regardless of their qualifications.

Some commentators are now suggesting that the filibuster rules are too broken to be fixed, and that the 60-vote requirement will soon disappear entirely. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell already threatened that if the Democrats eliminated it for presidential appointments, the Republicans would eliminate it for other legislation the next time they are in the majority. Once it is gone, what majority would weaken its own position by bringing it back? An alternative would be to keep the 60-vote requirement for ending legislative debate, but go back to making Senators continue speaking on the floor until a cloture vote succeeds or the filibusterers give in to the will of the majority.

The filibuster rules were once a way of insuring that all Senators had their say, and that a minority could have ample opportunity to persuade the majority. What they became more recently was a way for a minority to block consideration of measures they disliked, without even having to present arguments on their merits. Minority rights are one thing, but denying the majority a right to take a vote is something else. In that context, yesterday’s rule change is a return to democratic process, not a radical departure from it.