Brown Is the New White

March 21, 2016

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Steve Phillips. Brown Is the New White: How the Demographic Revolution Has Created a New American Majority. New York: The New Press, 2015.

Steve Phillips makes the case that the United States already has a progressive majority, if the demographic growth and voting patterns of the nonwhite population are taken seriously. In 2012, President Obama won reelection with only 39% of the White vote, but with 93% of the Black vote, 71% of the Latino vote, and 73% of the Asian American vote. Other things being equal, this Democratic coalition should grow because of the rapid growth of the nonwhite population. “Each day, the size of the U.S. population increases by more than 8,000 people, and nearly 90 percent of that growth consists of people of color.”

This is not to say that progressive Whites are an insignificant part of the coalition. If only people of color voted reliably Democratic, then any significant political shift could not occur until around 2044, when the U.S. is expected to become a “majority minority” country. But looking at it that way assumes more white-nonwhite polarization than actually exists, and it “overlooks the equation that’s been hiding in plain sight.” Add progressive Whites to progressive people of color, and “this calculation reveals that America has a progressive, multiracial majority right now that has the power to elect presidents and reshape American politics, policies, and priorities for decades to come.”

Historically, the growing political significance of people of color goes back to two major legislative acts of 1965. The Voting Rights Act enabled African Americans to vote in many states where they had been prevented from doing so. The Immigration and Nationality Act got rid of the old quota system that had favored European immigrants, thus opening the door to more Asians, Latin Americans and Africans. Illegal immigration has changed the electorate too, since the children born here are citizens with voting rights even if their parents are not.

Consider the demographics of the various groups:

Non-Latino Whites are 63% of the population and 71% of the Citizen Voting Age Population. They are a much larger portion of the older population than the younger, however, and their overall proportion will continue to decline. On the average they have voted 40% Democratic since 1972.

African Americans are 13% of both the total population and the Citizen Voting Age Population. They have an exceptionally strong allegiance to the Democratic Party.

Latinos are now 17% of the population but only 10% of the Citizen Voting Age Population, since so many are undocumented or not old enough to vote. However, young Latinos are turning eighteen at a rate of about 800,000 a year. Latinos surpassed African Americans in population in 2001, but they have not surpassed them in voting population. They vote much more Democratic than Republican, but not as Democratic as Blacks.

Asian Americans are 6% of the population and 4% of the Citizen Voting Age Population. Their rate of growth in the population surpasses all the others. They also tend to vote Democratic.

Phillips sees a “New American Majority” that is now at 51% of the electorate and growing. He bases this on a simple calculation that multiplies each group’s percentage of the country’s eligible voters by the group’s support for Barack Obama in 2012. (One has to accept the latter as a decent indicator of progressive sentiment.) For example, Latinos are 10% of the country’s voters and voted 71% for Obama, so it follows that 7% of the electorate may be considered progressive Latinos. Similar calculations reveal an electorate that includes 28% progressive Whites, 12% progressive Blacks, 3% progressive Asians, and 1% other progressives. Total: 51 percent!

Phillips identifies 33 states where this new majority “has an outright or soon-to-be-outright mathematical majority of eligible voters.” That’s a total of 398 electoral votes, far more than the 270 required to win the presidency. The new majority is especially influential in big cities, while what might be called the old majority is more prominent in rural areas. This urban-rural split, along with some very effective Republican gerrymandering, accounts for the pattern of governance in states like Texas and North Carolina, where Republicans control the state government and the Congressional delegation while Democrats control many large cities.

The next post will discuss the implications of these changes for political strategy and policy. How can the Democratic Party best consolidate a progressive coalition?

Continued


On the Run (part 2)

February 15, 2016

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Alice Goffman’s book has created some controversy not only because of her concerns about over-policing and mass incarceration, but because of her research methods and decisions. She began the project as an undergraduate in an urban ethnography class. An urban ethnographer studies a city much as an anthropologist would study a native village, using participant observation to share people’s lives–learning their language, studying their traditions, understanding their beliefs, and so forth. For Goffman it meant living in a black Philadelphia neighborhood, hanging out with her main informant “Mike” and his friends (she also took him in as a roommate for a time), and observing their many interactions with the police and the courts.

Readers who have never attempted such a thing may have trouble appreciating the difficulty of the task. It means maintaining a delicate balance between participating and observing, becoming an insider and remaining a detached observer. One has to participate authentically enough to be accepted and trusted, but retain enough detachment to ask questions insiders might not ask, take voluminous field notes, and interpret what one observes in the light of a broader sociological perspective. There is also an ethical challenge: maintaining one’s own moral compass rather than thoughtlessly conforming to the expectations of one’s subjects.

Becoming accepted into an urban subculture can be every bit as challenging as immersing oneself in a foreign culture. At first, Goffman had trouble understanding what her subjects were talking about, since they were referencing experiences she hadn’t had, using words in unfamiliar ways. In order to hang out with them, she had not only to learn their language, but also to construct a role for herself within their world. She had to distinguish the things she would do, like drive guys places or visit them in jail, from the things she wouldn’t, like smoke dope or become romantically involved with her subjects. As a privileged white female, she couldn’t entirely play the role of an underprivileged black male, but in many situations she could act almost as if she were such a person.

In this vein, Goffman describes how she handled the issue of gender. As a participant observer of primarily male subjects, she didn’t want to play a conventional female role, since “the world of women was a separate sphere from the life of the street.” Her solution was to present a more ambiguous image:

Though I came to 6th Street as a young blond woman, my body, speech, clothing, and general personality marked me as somewhat strange and unappealing. After spending a few months with Mike and his friends, I moved even further away from their ideals of beauty or femininity, in part as a strategy to conduct the fieldwork, and in part because I was, as a participant observer, adopting their male attitudes, dress, habits, and even language.

Goffman was so successful immersing herself in the world of 6th Street that she began to have some problems with the other side of her life, the life of a sociology student. She was missing appointments with professors and getting failing grades in some classes. Her close association with men on the run was also bringing her under suspicion by the police, who sometimes threatened to arrest her “for harboring fugitives, or interfering with an arrest, or holding drugs in the apartment.” Goffman doesn’t try to establish whether or not her behavior would actually justify such accusations, but she does remark that “the likelihood that I’d soon go to prison seemed about equal to the chance I would make it to graduate school.” In fact, however, she managed to save her academic career by gaining early acceptance to Princeton.

While in graduate school, Goffman continued to live in Philadelphia but commute two or three times a week to Princeton. She reports experiencing a kind of reverse culture shock when she had to adapt to the world of graduate school after living so long around 6th Street. Because she had come to share the black male’s fear of the police, she found herself uncomfortable with any white man who looked young and fit enough to be a cop. She also reports some confusion about her gender and sexual identities: “After spending six years in a Black neighborhood, hanging out with young men, I’d come to feel almost asexual. During college, I dated no one; I’d sometimes feel surprise when a mirror returned the image of a young woman.”

Goffman ends her methodological appendix with her most troubling suggestion, that she may have been damaged by some of her experiences. When Mike’s close friend Chuck was murdered, she acknowledges that she wanted Chuck’s killer to die, although she also says that “at the time and certainly in retrospect, my desire for vengeance scared me.” Goffman is hardly alone in having experienced such a desire, but as a participant observer she was in a position to act on it. On one occasion when Mike went looking for Chuck’s killer with a gun, she drove him. And when Mike got out to confront the possible killer, “I waited in the car with the engine running, ready to speed off as soon as Mike ran back and got inside.” Fortunately, Mike decided he didn’t have the right man, or Goffman could easily have wound up being an accessory to murder.

Some reviewers seem eager to discredit the whole book on ethical grounds, condemning Goffman as well as the people she studied. But maybe that is another way of dissociating ourselves from a social scene whose dangers repel us. The alternative is once again to learn how easily ordinary people can get caught up in bad behavior if they find themselves in bad situations. Goffman’s larger point remains valid, that many social forces and policies have contributed to making those bad situations what they are. For me, she is a courageous young woman who sacrificed a lot in order to bridge a racial divide and enhance understanding of a social problem.

 


On the Run

February 10, 2016

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Alice Goffman. On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City. Picador: Kindle Edition, 2015.

Alice Goffman contributes some remarkable firsthand observations to the growing debate over the American criminal justice system. She adds her voice to those who suggest that the costs to society of extremely high arrest and imprisonment rates may be outweighing the benefits. Locking up so many people is not only costing a lot of money, but it is deepening social divisions and aggravating economic and racial inequalities.

A sociological perspective

As a sociologist, Goffman appreciates how powerfully human activity is shaped by social interaction and social organization. (She is, by the way, the daughter of renowned sociologist Erving Goffman, although he died when she was very young.) If there’s one thing that sociologists stress, it is that individuals don’t devise their beliefs and behaviors all by themselves. That applies to the behaviors we call criminal too, although thinking sociologically is especially challenging in that area. Sociology goes against the understandable tendency to dissociate ourselves from behavior we don’t like, to regard it simply as a product of bad individuals, having little to do with people like us, our beliefs, practices or social policies.

But if crime were nothing but individual pathology, what would we make of our country’s exceptional rates of incarceration?

The United States currently imprisons five to nine times more people than western European nations, and significantly more than China and Russia. Roughly 3 percent of adults in the nation are now under correctional supervision: 2.2 million people in prisons and jails, and an additional 4.8 million on probation or parole. In modern history, only the forced labor camps of the former USSR under Stalin approached these levels of penal confinement.

Particularly troubling are the disproportionate imprisonment rates of young black men, one out of nine compared to about one out of fifty young white men. The cumulative effect is even more startling: “One in four Black children born in 1990 had an imprisoned father by the time he or she turned fourteen.” Such statistics call out for a systemic explanation:

In a community where only few young men end up in prison, we might speak of bad apples or of people who have fallen through the cracks. Given the unprecedented levels of policing and imprisonment in poor Black communities today, these individual explanations make less sense. We begin to see a more deliberate social policy at work.

Goffman herself is a white person from a fairly privileged background, but her sociological perspective will be challenging for white readers who want to dissociate themselves from black problems. I would suggest that this dissociation can have racist implications, since one is likely to think that there must be something seriously wrong with a group of people who generate such high rates of imprisonment all by themselves. But that’s exactly what sociology questions. Sociology does not require us to do a 180-degree turn, believing that the people society calls guilty are really innocent, although that is true in some cases. It does require us to acknowledge that the unresolved conflicts of our society, especially conflicts of class and race, help produce both crime itself and society’s response to crime. It helps us see that overly punitive responses can become part of the problem by further marginalizing the most disadvantaged among us. Goffman observes that it is the poorer young men who tend to get caught up in the criminal justice system, “though the crimes that start them off in the penal system are often crimes of which richer young men, both Black and white, are also guilty: fighting, drug possession, and the like.” Criminalization is a joint product of patterns of behavior and patterns of enforcement, both of which are affected by race and class.

The setting

Goffman served as a participant-observer in a Philadelphia neighborhood she calls “6th Street.” It consisted of five residential blocks at the south end of a commercial avenue. In the 1950s and 60s, it was a middle-class Jewish neighborhood, but it began to open to middle-class Blacks in the 1970s. By the 1980s, the area had changed economically as well as racially, as all the white families had moved out and developers had started targeting the neighborhood for low-income housing. Although it was not the poorest or most dangerous of Philadelphia neighborhoods, job opportunities were limited, and young men often turned to illegal ways of making money, especially dealing drugs. For several years, Goffman lived in the community and hung out with its residents, especially young men who had run-ins with the law.

Goffman reports, “For many decades, the Philadelphia police had turned a fairly blind eye to the prostitution, drug dealing and gambling that went on in poor Black communities.” But by the 1980s, police were becoming less receptive to payoffs and more vigorous in enforcing the laws. In the same era, society responded to high crime rates by imposing harsher penalties for both violent and nonviolent crimes. These policies continued even as many forms of crime declined in the 1990s. While the doors of opportunity were opening for some Blacks as a result of the Civil Rights Movement, prison doors were closing on a remarkable number of others.

As a participant-observer, Goffman is in a position to make a unique contribution to our understanding by seeing what the community looks like from the residents’ perspective. That contribution may not be appreciated by those who would rather just distance themselves from people and behaviors they dislike. For them, Goffman may appear too sympathetic to her subjects and even complicit in their crimes. I will have more to say about the author’s methods and the ethical challenges they entailed in my next post.

A community of suspects and fugitives

Goffman’s main thesis is that “historically high imprisonment rates and the intensive policing and surveillance that have accompanied them are transforming poor Black neighborhoods into communities of suspects and fugitives.” Each resident’s legal status becomes a “central social fact” around which social identity and lifestyle are organized. “Those who have no pending legal entanglements or who can successfully get through a police stop, a court hearing, or a probation meeting are known as clean. Those likely to be arrested should the authorities stop them, run their names, or search them are known as dirty.”

How easy it is to go from clean to dirty is illustrated by the case of a high school student Goffman calls “Chuck”. He was a senior in good standing when he got into a school yard fight. “According to the police report, Chuck didn’t hurt the other guy much, only pushed his face into the snow, but the school cops charged him with aggravated assault.” He spent some time in jail before the charges were dismissed, and he was refused readmission to his high school because he had now turned nineteen. A judge ordered him rearrested for failing to pay $225 in court fees. “By the time many young men in the neighborhood have entered their late teens or early twenties, the penal system has largely replaced the educational system as the key setting of young adulthood.”

It is not just incarceration that disrupts young lives, but the conditions of parole or probation:

The supervisory restrictions of probation and parole bar these men from going out at night, driving a car, crossing state lines, drinking alcohol, seeing their friends, and visiting certain areas in the city. Coupled with an intense policing climate, these restrictions mean that encounters with the authorities are highly likely, and may result in a violation of the terms of release and a swift return to jail or prison.

Young men with legal entanglements learn to fear and avoid the police. They don’t call the police when they themselves are victimized. They fly under the radar by not seeking formal employment. They avoid places where police keep a watchful eye, such as hospitals (even when their child is being born or they require medical attention) and funerals (where on many different occasions Goffman observed the police filming mourners as they entered the church).

Police often pressure women to inform on their husbands, boyfriends or sons. They may threaten women with arrest, loss of child custody, or eviction from their apartments. In some police raids, they destroy property and even physically abuse women. Women go back and forth between succumbing to such pressure and trying to repair the damage their collaboration with the authorities inflicts upon relationships. “The police’s strategy of arresting large numbers of young men by turning their mothers and girlfriends against them goes far in creating a culture of fear and suspicion, overturning women’s basic understandings of themselves as good people and their lives as reasonably secure, and destroying familial and romantic relationships that are often quite fragile to begin with.”

Goffman describes a special kind of black market that develops to serve the needs of legally troubled men. An enterprising young man makes over $100 a week doing telephone impersonations of men on probation or parole, so that officers will think they are at home. A supervisor in an overcrowded halfway house takes money in return for letting residents sneak out at night, justifying it as a humane response to an inhumane system (“Each night I give a man is a night he remembers he’s a human being, not an animal”).

From these and many other observations, Goffman draws a general conclusion:

Thus, the great paradox of a highly punitive approach to crime control is that it winds up criminalizing so much of daily life as to foster widespread illegality as people work to circumvent it. Intensive policing and the crime it intends to control become mutually reinforcing. The extent to which crime elicits harsh policing, or policing itself contributes to a climate of violence and illegality, becomes impossible to sort out.

Historical oppression continued?

Some sociologists have compared today’s disproportionate incarceration of racial and ethnic minorities to earlier systems of racial oppression. Historically, the criminal justice system played a major role in enforcing slavery and Jim Crow. Blacks who tried to escape their subservient roles became fugitives subject to criminalization, whether runaway slaves, sharecroppers who couldn’t leave the land without running out on debts to landowners, or “vagrants” without acceptable employment. What is being imposed today is more subtle, confinement to a standard of living far below that of the surrounding society, enforced by the threat of worse confinement within a greatly expanded penal system.

One thing that distinguishes the current system from past forms of oppression is that it is not based on race alone. The United States today is officially a more racially equal society. Aggressive policing and large-scale incarceration are reserved primarily for low-income, high-crime neighborhoods. A small black middle class has been able to move to more affluent, integrated neighborhoods where criminalization is less likely. That is a mixed blessing, however, since it has enabled so many whites to deny that the country still has a race problem. What racist country would elect a black president, people ask? But the problem of race will persist as long as the extreme disparities in income and economic opportunity remain correlated with race. Society’s responses to the problems associated with poverty will primarily target black neighborhoods.  Inevitably, much popular resentment will also be directed toward those neighborhoods, in reaction either to the problems themselves or to the tax dollars that are spent to address them.

So what is oppressive today is America’s peculiar intersection of race and class. The fact that so many black people are poor helps white people develop negative stereotypes about them, while racial stereotyping and discrimination (including racial profiling) help keep people poor.

Goffman concludes:

We might understand the US ghetto as one of the last repressive regimes of the age: one that operates within our liberal democracy, yet unbeknownst to many living only a few blocks away. In a nation that has officially rid itself of a racial caste system, and has elected and reelected a Black president, we are simultaneously deploying a large number of criminal justice personnel at great taxpayer cost to visit an intensely punitive regime upon poor Black men and women living in our cities’ segregated neighborhoods.

Once we see the problem is such systemic terms, we can also see that it isn’t enough to blame the police, as Goffman acknowledges. They cannot solve America’s socioeconomic problems with arrest and imprisonment alone. And as long as we expect them to, we will only perpetuate and even aggravate those problems.

Continued


A Living Wage (Glickman, part 2)

February 11, 2015

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The previous post discussed how Lawrence Glickman links the demand for a living wage to the historical transformation of the US economy. As independently owned and managed farms and businesses became less common, American workers had to rethink their hostility to working for wages. Increasingly they pinned their hopes for freedom and independence on better wages instead of on control over their own labor. The labor movement called for a high American standard of consumption supported by a living wage, at least for white males.

An idea whose time had come

By the end of the nineteenth century, this idea was gaining support beyond the labor movement itself. “Religious reformers were the first group outside of the labor movement to call for a living wage, beginning with Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical of 1891.” The Pope declared it a “dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man.” In 1906, the Catholic priest and social activist John Ryan, published A Living Wage, which also made a distinction between prevailing market wages and ethical wages based on natural moral law. Prevailing wages were partly determined by the relative power of capital and labor, so were unlikely to reflect the true value of workers or their work. [On a personal note, my father told me that when he studied economics at a Catholic college in the 1930s, his ethics professor argued for the moral responsibility of employers to pay a living wage.]

States began passing minimum-wage laws in 1912, and the platform of the Democratic Party began calling for a federal minimum wage in 1916. From organized labor’s point of view, the minimum wage was exactly that, only the lowest point on the “spectrum of conceivable living wages,” but it was a start.

Opposition to higher wages was still intense in the early 1900s. The opposing arguments were partly economic, based on the idea that the wage set by the market represented the real value of labor. But this easily became a moral argument: since the worker’s labor was only worth what the market said it was worth, any demand for more was an immoral attempt to get something for nothing. Another argument was that any interference with the labor market violated the principle of freedom of contracts. A market wage represented an agreement between two free parties, but a legally mandated minimum deprived employers of their right to bargain freely with workers. It was this last argument that most impressed the Supreme Court when it declared minimum-wage laws unconstitutional in 1923. [It probably didn’t occur to justices to worry about whether the individual worker really had much freedom to bargain with a powerful employer.]

By the 1930s, support for a living wage became stronger, as economists, politicians and the general public came to associate low wages with economic depression. President Roosevelt stated it bluntly in 1938: “We suffer primarily from a failure of consumer demand because of lack of buying power.” With the productive capacity of the nation expanding, not to raise wages made it impossible for workers to buy enough goods to keep the factories humming and the labor force employed.

I don’t recall Glickman telling this part of the story, but the Supreme Court reversed itself in 1937 and upheld a state minimum-wage law. Interestingly, this happened because a certain Justice named Roberts departed from his usual practice of voting with the four most conservatives justices (perhaps setting a precedent for the Affordable Care Act!). This decision marked the end of an era in which the Court had generally resisted government efforts to regulate industry.

In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act, which set a national minimum wage and a standard work week of forty hours beyond which overtime must be paid. Perhaps just as important, although not discussed by Glickman, the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 gave workers the right to organize and bargain collectively. A combination of union organizing and government support helped millions of workers achieve a higher standard of living and move into the middle class.

An idea whose time has gone?

Because Glickman is concerned primarily with the rise of the living wage as an idea, he ends his story in the early twentieth century with its partial implementation. He does not address the question of why the struggle for higher wages became so much harder in the latter part of the century, or why the very term “living wage” went out of fashion. I’ll just mention a few of the many developments that impeded or even reversed the progress that workers had been making:

  1. Runaway inflation not only eroded the buying power of wages, but it also reduced popular support for wage increases, since high wages could be blamed for inflation.
  2. Globalization undermined the argument for a distinctly “American standard” of wages. Employers could justify low wages in order to keep their companies globally competitive, or replace well-paid US workers with lower-paid foreign workers.
  3. New technologies reduced the demand for unskilled labor and the market price of that labor.
  4. Globalization and automation led to job losses in the highly unionized manufacturing sector, while employment in the less unionized service sector expanded. The decline of unions reduced the workers’ political clout too, since the labor-friendly Democratic Party had relied heavily on unions for its grass-roots organizing.
  5. The decline of the patriarchal, male-breadwinner family undermined the argument for a “family wage.” In theory, wages could be lower if families were accustomed to relying on multiple earners, but households with only one earner lost ground.
  6. The struggle for higher wages focused increasingly on racial minorities and women, who had been largely excluded from high wages in the past. Many white males felt threatened, however, and became more interested in holding on to what they had than advancing the cause of labor in general. They abandoned their traditional Democratic allegiance and voted Republican in large numbers, especially in the South, helping insure that public policy would tilt toward business and away from labor. The labor movement eventually paid a price for once thinking of the living wage as only a white man’s wage.

A new interest?

The recent attention focused on economic inequality suggests that the issue of just wages may once again move center stage. At the low end of the income scale, increases in the minimum wage have failed to keep up with inflation. In today’s dollars, the original minimum of about $4 an hour increased to over $10 in the 1960s before falling back to $7.25 since then. Meanwhile, incomes in the middle have largely stagnated while incomes at the top have increased dramatically (especially after-tax incomes because of large tax cuts for the wealthy).

Thomas Piketty observes that in the US recently, “income from labor is about as unequally distributed as has ever been observed anywhere,” with the top tenth of workers receiving 35% of the total and bottom half of workers only 25%. Income from investments is even more uneven, since the share of wealth controlled by the richest tenth has risen to over 70% in recent decades. The distribution of total income is a combination of the distributions of both labor income and investment income. The share of total income going to the top tenth fluctuated in the range of 30-35% between 1950 and 1980, but has gone up to 45-50% since 2000. So 15% of the national income has been transferred to the top tenth from everybody else. (See my discussion of Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, especially part 3.)

In our new Gilded Age, with the rich living in increasing luxury while so many others can barely scrape by at all, the stage may be set for a new national discussion of a living wage.


A Living Wage (Glickman)

February 9, 2015

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Lawrence B. Glickman. A Living Wage: American Workers and the Making of Consumer Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997.

This week, I turn to an older book than I usually discuss because I want to provide some background on the current debate over just wages. The struggle for higher wages goes back a long way, of course. Labor leaders started talking about the “living wage” in the 1870s, and the concept was widely discussed during the Progressive Era. The country’s first minimum wage law was passed in Massachusetts in 1912.

Lawrence Glickman links the concept of the living wage to the great economic transformation of the United States, involving both the ascendancy of industrial wage labor and the acceptance of mass consumption as an economic counterpart of industrial production. Both of these developments forced Americans to confront the question of the adequacy of wages.

“Wage slavery”

Before the Civil War, the very idea of wage labor was a contested notion. Children worked for wages, and so did young adults unless and until they acquired enough property to have their own trade, shop or farm. But the ideal American was generally thought to be an independent producer of some kind. Even as wage labor was becoming more common by the mid-1800s, “nineteenth-century workers deemed it acceptable only as a temporary step on the way to self-employment.”

The popular concepts of liberty and self-government were commonly applied to individuals as well as the nation as a whole, and they included the idea of being in control of one’s own labor. Selling one’s labor to an employer meant losing one’s liberty and being reduced to a mere commodity. “Some workers considered wage slavery more dehumanizing than chattel slavery because employers, unlike slaveholders, did not have to provide even basic subsistence.”

Critics of “wage slavery” often compared it to prostitution, blurring the distinction between the “wages of sin” and the “sin of wages.” On one level this was a powerful metaphor, comparing two activities that involved selling one’s body. But it could also be a powerful narrative, the story of how low wages drove women into the most immoral of economic transactions. The living wage could refer to either of two solutions: a female wage high enough to remove any need for prostitution, or a male wage high enough to support an entire family and so eliminate any need for a women to make money.

These two views of prostitution–as a metaphor for all wage labor or a narrative about low wages–correspond to two different views of the wage labor problem. The more radical critique was that wage labor by its very nature robs the workers of their freedom as well as of some portion of the value of their labor. The more moderate critique was that wage labor was acceptable if wages were high enough to support families. As industrialization proceeded and the US became predominantly a nation of wage-earners, the second view came to prevail. The term “wage slave” faded into the background, and the term “living wage” came to the forefront. A newer conception of liberty, the freedom to live well through consumption, superseded the older notion of freedom through independent production.

Conceptions of the living wage

In 1898, American Federation of Labor president Samuel Gompers defined the living wage as “sufficient to maintain an average-sized family in a manner consistent with whatever the contemporary local civilization recognizes as indispensable to physical and mental health, or as required by the rational self-respect of human beings.”

From the beginning, the living wage was a vague and controversial idea. Many economists maintained that wages were determined by impersonal economic forces in accordance with scientific laws. They regarded assertions that wages should be higher than they already were as at best irrelevant and at worst a threat to the natural order of things. Others acknowledged that wages had a moral dimension, but supported only a “fair wage” based exclusively on the value of what workers produced, not on what they needed to consume.

Even advocates of living wages had trouble agreeing on what standard of consumption to apply. Was it enough to meet the subsistence needs of the worker, or should it allow for support of a family? Was it a fixed standard based on unchanging needs, or should it expand along with the nation’s productive capacity?

Most labor leaders came to define the living wage rather broadly to include family needs and gradually rising living standards. “Fundamental to the concept of the living wage for most proponents was the belief that needs were ever expanding, that wages should grow correspondingly, and that the limitless capacity of production made continual growth possible.” Labor theorist Ira Steward developed a concept of “productive consumption” that linked rising consumption with the general well-being of society. He opposed the old producerist morality that saw frugality as a virtue and spending as a vice, regarding it as an excuse to underpay workers. While he condemned spending on certain “human follies and vices” like drinking and gambling, he regarded more “civilized” forms of spending as good for families, good for the economy, and good for society.

The idea of the living wage became closely associated with an “American standard” of consumption. As one advocate put it, “The American laborer should not be expected to live like the Irish tenant farmer or the Russian serf. His earning ought to be sufficient to enable him to live as a respectable American citizen.” By insisting on good wages, American workers could claim their fair share of rising productivity, support families, and sustain the growing economy through their buying power.

The living wage and the “American standard” became entangled with issues of race, nationality and gender. To put it simply, it was often seen as the proper wage for a white man. Such a good wage might be wasted on Chinese or African-American workers, whose lower standards were said to make them both more accepting of lower wages and unable to use more money constructively. Instead of making common cause with the most disadvantaged classes of workers, white workers tried to set themselves above and apart from them. “The ‘caucasions’, Samuel Gompers bluntly wrote in 1905, ‘are not going to let their standard of living be destroyed by negroes, Chinamen, Japs, or any others.'”

The living wage was also entangled with a patriarchal conception of family in which the man was the sole breadwinner. His wage was the one that needed to be high enough to support a spouse and children. Should a woman need to support herself, she only needed the bare minimum to survive and avoid prostitution. That meant that the modern conception of freedom and independence based on well-paid labor was primarily for male breadwinners. Only the most radical elements of the labor movement questioned women’s continued dependence on men.

Glickman summarizes, “In adjusting to the wage labor economy, organized workers used the idea of the American standard of living not only to reclaim economic and political rights that they feared they were losing in the new economy but also to exclude other groups from its benefits.”

After emerging in the labor movement of the nineteenth century, the idea of the living wage gained much broader support in the twentieth, although not without continued opposition as well. That will be the subject of my next post.

Continued